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Zusammenfassung 
 
 i 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Wie werden monetäre Impulse der Zentralbank auf die Realwirtschaft übertragen? Diese immer 
noch nicht abgeschlossene Debatte um die Funktionsweise der Zentralbankpolitik beschäftigt 
Ökonomen seit über zweihundert Jahren. Die gegenwärtige Antwort der Forschung hierzu ist eine 
Reihe von Transmissionskanälen. So haben neben dem traditionellen Zinskanal der Vermögens-, 
der Wechselkurs, der Erwartungs- und der Kreditkanal Eingang in die Lehrbücher gefunden. 
Beim Kreditkanal wird üblicherweise zwischen dem Bilanzkanal und dem Bankkreditkanal bzw. 
Bank Lending Channel (BLC) unterschieden. Letzterer steht im Fokus dieser Arbeit und ist 1988 
von Bernanke und Blinder entwickelt worden. Dabei wird postuliert, dass sich monetäre Impulse 
nicht nur über relative Preise wie Zinssätze oder Vermögenspreise auf die Realwirtschaft 
übertragen. Stattdessen wird ein zusätzlicher Effekt auf die gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage über 
das Kreditvolumen propagiert. Da die Zentralbank über das Bankkreditangebot ebenfalls die 
Kreditmenge steuern kann, habe sie eine weitere Einwirkungsmöglichkeit auf das 
Ausgabeverhalten der Wirtschaftssubjekte. Daher untersuchen auch Bernanke und Blinder (1988) 
auf der Grundlage ihres Modells, inwieweit sich quantitative Größen wie Kredit- und Geldmenge 
als Steuerungsziel und auch als Zwischenziel für die praktische Zentralbankpolitik eignen.  
 
Diese Ansicht von Vertretern des BLC, dass also die Zentralbank die Kreditmenge und damit 
unabhängig von relativen Preisen die gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage beeinflussen kann, wird in 
dieser Arbeit in theoretischer und empirischer Hinsicht kritisch hinterfragt. Diese Auffassung 
spricht nicht nur dem Kreditvolumen sondern auch der Geldmenge einen zusätzlichen 
Transmissionseffekt zu. Dem vielfach vermuteten Einfluss der Geldmenge auf die 
Vermögenspreise und die Inflation liegen dem BLC vergleichbare Argumentationsmuster zu 
Grunde. Dieses ist zwar nicht Gegenstand dieser Arbeit, steht aber gegenwärtig ebenfalls auf dem 
Prüfstand. Als Beispiel kann da die umstrittene Diskussion um die Rolle der Geldmenge bei der 
Erklärung der Höhe der Vermögenspreise oder die kontroverse Debatte um die zweite, monetäre 
Säule der Europäischen Zentralbank dienen.        
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit konzentriert sich aber auf den BLC und die Kreditmenge und besteht aus 
drei Aufsätzen, obwohl jeder Essay als separate Einheit versanden werden kann. Da jedoch der 
Fokus dieser Essays auf den gleichen Unterssuchungsgegenstand ausgerichtet ist, werden die 
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Aufsätze in Kapitel umbenannt und in dieser vorliegenden Abhandlung, die mit einer kurzen 
historischen Würdigung des BLC eröffnet (Kapitel I), zusammengefasst. Zunächst aber erfolgt 
eine Zusammenfassung der Aufsätze (Kapitel II-IV), die dem Leser einen Ausblick auf die 
Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit gewähren soll. 
 
Aufsatz 1 (Kapitel II): Auf theoretischer Ebene werden Kritikpunkte gegen den BLC und gegen 
die erste und richtungweisende Modellierung von Bernanke und Blinder (1988) präsentiert. 
Zentrale Modellfunktionen wie die der Kreditnachfrage, des Geldangebots und der 
Geldnachfrage sind unplausibel konstruiert. Dabei vermag die Logik des BLC für einzelne 
Investoren, die vom verminderten Bankkreditangebot betroffen sind, gelten. Bei gegebenem 
Zinsniveau gilt dieses Argument aber nicht für den ganzen wirtschaftlichen Sektor, da die 
Reduktion von Bankkrediten nicht die Nachfrage nach Investitionsgütern sondern nur die 
Geldhaltung mindert. 
 
Aufsatz 2 (Kapitel III): Seit 1988 haben Forscher das Modell von Bernanke und Blinder benutzt, 
um die Frage nach der quantitativen Relevanz des BLC empirisch zu klären. Cecchetti (1995) 
und Hubbard (1995) erfassen die Entwicklung der Empirie bis dato, die überwiegend in den USA 
mit US Zahlenmaterial stattfand. Hier wird ein Überblick über die Literatur seit Mitte der 90-er 
präsentiert, der die Entwicklung in Europa einfängt. Vorherrschend ist dabei, dass europäische 
Zentralbankforscher Ansätze von Kashyap und Stein (1995, 2000) und von Kishan und Opiela 
(2000) zum US-Transmissionsmechanismus. Zentrales Merkmal dieser Ansätze ist, dass sie als 
erste nicht-aggregiertes Zahlenmaterial aus Bankbilanzen verwenden. Dennoch sind die Resultate 
der empirischen Untersuchungen nicht konsistent. Dies wird umso offensichtlicher, wenn man 
bedenkt, dass die Mehrzahl der Untersuchungen unzureichend um die Transmissionskanäle, die 
auf relativen Preisen basieren, kontrollieren.  
 
Aufsatz 3 (Kapitel IV): Die Debatte um die Funktionsweise der Zentralbankpolitik hat noch kein 
Ende gefunden: Dem BLC, der die Bedeutung der potentiellen Variation des Bankkreditangebots 
durch die Zentralbankpolitik und die Auswirkung auf die gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage 
betont, mangelt es trotz seiner kürzlich erlangten Prominenz an abschließender empirischer 
Evidenz. Ich versuche einen Beitrag zur dieser Diskussion zu leisten, indem ich eine 
Zusammenfassung 
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Querschnitts- und eine Panelanalyse mit dem Zahlenmaterial von entwickelten und zu 
entwickelnden Ländern durchführe und als abhängige Variable die Verfügbarkeit von 
Bankkrediten wähle. Die Wahl der abhängigen Variable umgeht das Identifikationsproblem, das 
entsteht, wenn man die Entwicklung der aggregierten Bankkredite im Anschluss an die Operation 
der Zentralbank analysiert. Diese empirische Untersuchung findet keine Unterstützung für die 
These, dass der BLC ein über den Zinskanal hinaus zusätzlicher Transmissionsmechanismus 
monetärer Impulse auf die Realwirtschaft ist. 
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I Introduction 
On 10 March 2008, the Federal Reserve once again offered a 28-day credit to depository 
institutions (‘banks’) under the term auction facility (TAF) for a fixed amount and with the rate 
determined by the auction process. In the midst of the turmoil in the real estate and financial 
markets and with the onset of a recession in the United States, the Federal Reserve provided 
liquidity to the financial system via the TAF. In his testimony before the Committee on the 
Budget 17 January 2008, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Benjamin S. Bernanke (2008: 3), 
stated that the “goal of the TAF is to reduce the incentive for banks to hoard cash and increase 
their willingness to provide credit to households and firms.” Hence, even without changing 
interest rates the Federal Reserve aimed at influencing banks’ lending. Will these repeatedly 
implemented actions succeed? Will banks reconsider their calculus on lending in times of 
deteriorating balance sheets of borrowers and less creditworthiness because the central bank 
provides more liquidity? Is it a coincidence that banks accumulate cash in these times? Why 
should more liquidity help make bank lending profitable again? Will the real economy be 
stimulated by liquidity injections of the Federal Reserve?   
 
This is a good example of how economic theory influences everyday monetary policy. Which 
concept lies behind this policy? The implemented action is based upon the theory called the bank 
lending channel (BLC) developed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and theoretically and 
empirically contested in this thesis.  
 
Ever since, it has been state-of-the-art to survey the main types of monetary transmission 
mechanisms as Mishkin (1995) or the European Central Bank (ECB) (2004) present them: the 
interest rate channel, the asset channel, the expectations channel, the exchange rate channel, the 
balance sheet channel and the BLC. All these mechanisms explain how the central bank’s 
impulses are transmitted to the real economy. This thesis is on the BLC and is a contribution to 
the central topic of debate in macroeconomics.  
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Distinguishing the monetary transmission mechanisms is useful for a variety of reasons. First, 
understanding which financial aggregates are affected by monetary policy would improve our 
understanding of the link between the financial and the real sectors of the economy. Second, a 
better understanding of the transmission mechanisms would help monetary authorities and 
analysts interpret movements in financial aggregates. Finally, more information about the 
transmission mechanisms might lead to a better choice of intermediate targets.  
 
This thesis consists of three separate essays on the recently developed transmission mechanism, 
the BLC, which are linked here to a new whole and renamed in chapters. The BLC has found 
entrance into macroeconomic textbooks – but it does not exist. In order to display the critique on 
this channel, I focus on the seminal paper by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) who formalized the 
BLC (Chapter II). Besides presenting critical remarks on theoretical grounds, I show in a 
literature survey that after almost two decades of empirical research, the existence of the BLC is 
still a conundrum (Chapter III). In Chapter IV, I provide empirical evidence from a cross-section 
of countries and a panel data analysis. This thesis – as other investigations – does not find support 
for the empirical evidence of the BLC.   
 
The essence of the BLC is the existence of an alleged additional channel of monetary 
transmission mechanism which spotlights loans on the asset side of banks. Enriching the 
traditional IS/LM-two-asset model by introducing bank loans, proponents of the BLC claim the 
central bank to have a further impact on the real economy through the possibility of shifting bank 
loans directly. That is, the central bank alters banks’ reserves in the context of open market 
operations, and banks respond by adjusting loans on their asset side since nonbank deposits (bank 
liabilities) change, too. This additional channel ought work, notwithstanding the traditional 
interest rate channel in the IS/LM framework. According to the interest rate channel, monetary 
impulses are transmitted via the bond rate which in turn affects interest-sensitive spending. 
Advocates of the BLC claim this volume effect stemming from reduced loans provides an 
additional reason for decreased investments, and they state that the central bank affects the real 
economy by altering this loan volume. Therefore, proponents of the BLC imply that central banks 
influence the real economy via relative prices such as interest rates and the loan volume, 
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Cecchetti (1995, 86). I will show that there is no theoretical plausibility and empirical evidence 
for this coexistence. Therefore, I do not find support for the BLC as an additional channel for 
conducting monetary policy. 
 
Wicksell picked up on early contributions of Thornton and Bagehot, posing that monetary 
transmission affects the real economy only via relative prices, that is interest rates and asset 
prices (Bindseil 2004: 20). This viewpoint has long been contested and a more direct 
transmission has been proposed: the quantities of money and credit were suggested as being 
linked to commodity demand even where relative prices remained unchanged. Various reasons 
have been suggested for this type of transmission, among them the quantity equation and 
Patinkin’s (1965) real balance effect. A more recent contribution in this series is the BLC, which 
has found its place in standard economic textbooks.  
 
Central bankers have recognized the existence of differing theories of monetary transmission by 
adopting an eclectic approach (ECB, 2004; Kuttner and Mosser, 2002). Given that many 
transmission channels may be relevant, the quantity of money and credit, and not only relative 
prices, are given importance in monetary policy. The BLC is repeatedly recognized as justifying 
the relevance of quantities (money and credit). Based on their theoretical findings Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988: 437) discuss following questions: “What does our model say about the suitability 
of money or credit as indicators? What about the target question, that is, about the choice 
between stabilizing money vs. stabilizing credit?” This is still a hotly debated issue for central 
bankers. The recent discussion within the ECB and among experts in the media has been about 
the importance of money growth for central banks’ operations.  
 
Is there a causality between money and credit and aggregate demand and prices? Does money 
growth affect aggregate demand? An example might give a good lead to answer these questions. 
Expansive monetary policy brings about reduced interest rates which affect decisions of 
economic agents and stimulate credit growth and aggregate demand. Lower interest rates also 
increase money demand of economic entities. Yet, money and credit growth do not impact on the 
aggregate demand since they are a by-product of monetary policy. Likewise, in the phase of 
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economic upswing, creditworthiness of debtors improves and credit growth will be the result of 
increased credit demand. Again, there is no causality from money and credit to aggregate demand 
since the growth of quantities is only the consequence of monetary policy in the first example, or 
economic upswing in the second. In this spirit, I criticize the BLC because its proponents 
postulate a causality and state that the central bank can stimulate or curb credit volume and 
herewith output beyond changes of relative prices. 
 
Before I present in detail the model developed by Bernanke and Blinder, the theoretical critique, 
the review of the empirical research, and my own investigation, it may be helpful to outline a 
very brief retrospection of past theoretical concepts to which the BLC is linked.  
 
In the monetary economics of the last 200 years, the prominence of the banking sector and bank 
lending has varied significantly in the relationship between the financial sphere and the real 
economy. Thornton (1802) and MacLeod (1855) made early contributions in this context and 
shed some light on banks that create money by taking deposits on the one hand and by lending to 
borrowers on the other. Both authors accentuated the role of banks and developed a theory of 
credit. Thornton particularly stressed that a change in the money supply is not directly transmitted 
into a different price level, but has an initial effect on the interest rate which affects spending and, 
eventually, prices. This is one of the first concepts of the transmission in which the transmission 
variable is the interest rate.  
 
Wicksell (1898) started to develop a new theory by dropping the prevailing assumption that the 
interest rate is the price on the capital market driven by real factors. In the short run he assumed 
the interest rate is determined by monetary factors. Wicksell developed a cashless economic 
system which is based on credit in order to improve the dominating “creditless” quantity theory 
and give rise to financial intermediation. His ideas relate to earlier works by Thornton and 
MacLeod when he stresses the active role of banks in the determination of interest rates and 
creation of money. According to Wicksell, a disrupted monetary equilibrium is a gap between the 
loan rate and the rate to real investment, or the capital rate of interest. In case of the relative lower 
loan rate, firms invest and demand loans because they are encouraged to do so. Banks provide 
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financial means and “create” money, leading to an increase in money supply. It is the gap in 
interest rates that causes excess demand on the goods market and an upward pressure on the price 
level. Thus, Wicksell stressed the cost-of-capital-argument also known from the later interest rate 
channel. Banks are central in Wicksell’s theory since they adjust the supply of loans to higher 
demand and restore the monetary equilibrium. The bottom line of his theory is that it serves as a 
building block for monetary transmission mechanisms developed in the next 100 or more years 
because the dichotomy in terms of short-run neutrality was broken.  
 
The BLC also stresses the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy and particularly 
the role of bank loans. Yet, the history of economic theory took another route and bank credit 
seemed to be dismissed during the following 50 or 60 years. These early contributions dropped 
bank lending in their concepts and the interest rate channel dominated the understanding of how 
monetary impulses are transmitted to the real economy. Hicks’s (1937) IS/LM interpretation of 
Keynes’ ideas is the essence of the interest rate channel which assumes the capital market to be 
perfect and distinguishes between two financial assets, money and bonds. The latter asset aimed 
to be the representative of the capital market. The third asset, loans, and a bank loan market were 
not included in the IS/LM as Bernanke and Blinder (1988) try to accomplish in the BLC. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that under strong assumptions financial structures do not 
influence spending decisions of borrowers and lenders. Thus, bonds and other assets such as bank 
loans are perfect substitutes. The magnitude of the interest rate change depends on how money is 
substituted by other assets, represented by bonds.  
 
The role of the financial intermediation revives again with Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1960). The 
effects of monetary policy on investor portfolios are closely analyzed by Brainard and Tobin 
(1963), Brainard (1964) and Tobin (1969). In this spirit but from different a dogmatic 
background, Brunner and Meltzer (1972) pay special attention to the credit market by developing 
a “monetarist model” with many other assets.  
 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) can be interpreted as a special case of these multi-asset models. 
They focus on the three-asset-world (money, bonds and bank loans) and assume in agreement 
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with Akerlof (1970) and many others that information is asymmetric on (credit) markets. Again, 
the role of banks attracts the spotlight: particularly financial intermediaries such as banks are 
capable of reducing informational frictions because they act as “delegated monitors,” Diamond 
(1984). A non-monitored finance in public markets suffers from a free-rider problem. As a 
consequence of this research, some borrowers become dependent on bank loans since the costs of 
switching lenders are significant. In the BLC the Modigliani-Miller theorem is therefore under 
attack because bank loans and bonds are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. Against this 
background, proponents of the BLC claim to have developed an additional transmission 
mechanism which I present and scrutinize in the following chapter. 
 
What are the results of this analysis? In a nutshell I briefly summarize the outcome of the 
theoretical and empirical essays. 
 
Chapter II: This essay is written on the basis of the paper by Bajec and Lambsdorff (2006). 
Monetary policy is commonly assumed to affect commodity demand via relative prices. The BLC 
proposes an additional effect via the quantity of loans. This has found its way into economic 
textbooks, although it remains empirically controversial. I present various theoretical criticisms 
of the BLC and its building block, the formal model by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). This model 
operates with lopsided loan demand, money demand and money supply functions. The logic of 
the BLC is valid for individual investors who are affected by a cut in bank loans. For a whole 
sector with a given level of interest rates, a reduction of loans does not dry up investment, only 
the holding of money. 
 
Chapter III: Since 1988 academics have been using model by Bernanke and Blinder as a work 
horse to empirically address the question of the quantitative relevance of the BLC. Cecchetti 
(1995) und Hubbard (1995) summarize the overall evolution of the controversial debate up to 
then. The data used for the research is mainly from the United States. In this literature review, I 
mainly focus on the next and more recent cohort of empirical investigations on the BLC in 
Europe that follow papers by Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) on 
U.S. transmission mechanisms. It is crucial that these authors are the first to address the question 
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using individual bank balance sheet data for the U.S. Until now, empirical research has produced 
largely inconsistent results. This is more revealing as many of these investigations have 
deficiencies in controlling for other transmission channels that relate to relative prices. 
  
Chapter IV: The debate on how monetary policy works has not ended: the BLC, which stresses 
the importance of potential changes in the supply of loans as a result of monetary policy, and its 
subsequent impact on aggregate demand, became prominent recently, but the concluding 
empirical evidence is absent. I attempt to contribute to this debate by conducting a cross-section 
and panel data analysis of developed and developing countries and by choosing the availability of 
bank loans as a dependent variable. The latter circumvents identification problems that appear 
when analyzing the response of aggregated bank loans to monetary policy changes. This evidence 
finds no support for the prediction of the BLC that there is an additional channel of monetary 
transmission mechanism. 
Is There A Bank Lending Channel? Some Theoretical Criticism 
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II Is There A Bank Lending Channel? Some Theoretical Criticism 
II.1 Introduction 
The BLC was developed by Bernanke and Blinder in 1988.1 It stresses the importance of 
potential changes in the supply of loans as a result of monetary policy and a subsequent impact 
on aggregate demand for goods and services, in particular business and residential investments as 
well as consumer durables, (Mishkin 2006: 621). That is, a tightening monetary policy such as an 
open market sale reduces nonbanks’ deposits at banks and banks’ reserves at the central bank. 
Therefore, banks have fewer funds available to supply loans and cut back lending. With 
borrowers depending on bank loans, investment spending is reduced. 
 
Empirical research has up to now produced largely inconsistent results, (Kashyap and Stein 1995, 
Hernando and Martinez-Pagés 2001 and de Bondt 1988). This is all the more revealing as many 
of these investigations have deficiencies in controlling for other transmission channels that relate 
to relative prices, (Cecchetti 1995, Oliner and Rudebusch 1996).  
 
This paper provides another challenge to the BLC, rejecting its existence on theoretical grounds.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2 I reproduce the BLC as developed by Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988), which is still the building block of contemporary research. In Section 3 I 
formulate the critique of the BLC and aim to highlight six theoretical facets that I find 
implausible. Section 4 concludes. 
II.2 Bernanke and Blinder’s Bank Lending Channel 
The model consists of three assets: money (deposits), loans and bonds. Banks contribute to the 
creation of money by issuing deposits and by buying bonds from the private sector (the 
                                                 
1
  Together with the balance sheet channel, the BLC forms what is regarded as the credit channel. The balance 
sheet channel relates to asset prices impacting on companies’ balance sheet and net worth. A deterioration of these 
indicators would increase the external finance premium and thus lower investment. Essentially, this can be regarded 
as a transmission via relative prices, whose existence we are not contesting here.  
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nonbanks) or issuing loans. The private sector holds money as assets and its liabilities consist of 
bank loans and corporate bonds.2 Table 1 displays balance sheets of all modelled parties: the 
private sector, banks and the central bank. 
 
The loan demand is ),,(
++−
= yiLLd ρ , where ρ is the interest rate on loans, i  is the interest rate on 
bonds and y  denotes GDP. All sheets ignore net worth. According to the central bank’s balance 
sheet, the monetary base, R, consists of banks’ reserve requirements, Dτ , and E, the excess 
reserves at the central bank. bB  stands for the bank’s holding of bonds and sL  for loans. On the 
liabilities side of the banks’ balance sheet D denotes deposits, which is held by nonbanks as 
assets. The central bank’s and commercial banks’ aggregated balance sheet is b sR B L D+ + = . 
                                                 
2
  Bernanke and Blinder do not to specify whether the bonds are corporate or publicly issued. In the spirit of 
the BLC, we assume that the private sector manages its liabilities by demanding bank loans or issuing bonds. Loans 
and bonds are consequently alternatives for the private sector. In the case of publicly issued bonds, nonbanks would 
hold government bonds as assets and acquire financial means by selling them. But then, the concept of substituting 
financial sources on the liabilities side is less straightforward and not in the logic of the BLC. Ultimately, this 
difference is not essential to the debate because financing by issuing corporate bonds is similar to selling government 
bonds.  
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Table 1: Balance Sheets of All Parties 
 
The model disregards currency and central bank loans to commercial banks. The only way a 
central bank conducts monetary policy is by buying or selling corporate bonds, which is denoted 
by an alteration of R.3 Banks’ adding up constraint can be rewritten as: )−=++ τ1(DELB sb . 
The loan supply is )−(=
−+
τρλ 1(), DiLs , assuming that structural changes of the banks’ desired 
portfolio are driven by variations in interest rates of assets. The equilibrium on the loan market is 
(1) )−(===
−+++−
τρλρ 1(),),,( DiLyiLL sd . 
The model states that banks hold bonds according to )−=
+
−
τρ 1(),( DibBb . There is no impact of 
ρ  on E and banks hold excess reserves according to: )−(=
−
τε 1()DiE . There is no explicit 
                                                 
3
  Bernanke and Blinder are not clear in stating whether central banks may also buy government bonds. Our 
conclusions remain valid with this modification when assuming that nonbanks hold government bonds instead of 
issuing corporate bonds.   
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function for bond supply, but due to the nonbank’s budget constraint, this must equal, 
RyiLyiDB s −−=
++−+−
),,(),( ρ . 
As can be easily derived, the supply of deposits (money) is equal to bank reserves times the 
money multiplier: RimD s )(
+
= .
4
 The demand for deposits is equal to the demand for money in a 
cashless economy. It is defined as ),(
+−
= yiDD d . Equating the demand for money and the money 
supply gives 
(2) RimyiD )(),(
++−
= .  
The equilibrium on the money market in Equation (2) is graphically represented by the 
conventional LM curve. Bernanke and Blinder insert (2) into (1) to obtain an for the loan market 
equilibrium 
(3) )−(===
+−+++−
τρλρ 1()(),),,( RimiLyiLL sd . 
In words, the equilibrium on the money market in (2) is used to rewrite the loan supply Ls and, 
hence, the equilibrium on the loan market in (3). Bernanke and Blinder make use of (3) to 
construct a substitute for the conventional IS curve that includes the loan market equilibrium. On 
the market for goods, it appears plausible that investment is negatively affected by both interest 
rates, that for loans and that for bonds, suggesting to rewrite the IS curve for output, y: 
(4) 
−
−
= ),( ρiYy 5. 
Assuming that dm/di is not too large, (3) can be solved for ρ as an implicit function of i , y , and 
R 
(5) ),,
−++
(= Ryiφρ . 
Substituting (5) into (4), one obtains 
(6) )),,,( RyiiYy (= φ , 
                                                 
4
  From R=τD+εD, we obtain D=R/(ε+τ). However, Bernanke and Blinder claim the money supplier to be 
[ε(1- τ)+τ]-1. We assume Bernanke and Blinder made a simple error that is immaterial to the core hypothesis of the 
paper. 
5
  In (3) Bernanke and Blinder refer to real interest rates but assume expected inflation to be zero. 
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which Bernanke and Blinder label the CC (commodities and credit) curve. Apparently, the CC 
curve is negatively sloped like the IS curve (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: The BLC 
 
The important point is that monetary policy shifts R in (2) and, hence, not only the LM curve but 
also the CC curve represented in (6). As a consequence of the policy induced shift of the CC 
curve, expansionary monetary policy affects y  twice because the curves shift in the same 
direction, i.e. outward. The effect on the interest rate is not easy to depict. Hence, Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988: 437) state that the BLC “makes monetary policy more expansionary than in 
IS/LM (…)”. Figure 2 illustrates this aspect. A tight monetary policy operation shifts the CC0 
curve to CC1 and the LM0 curve to LM1. The resulting equilibrium brings about yCC. In the 
textbook IS/LM model, contractionary monetary policy shifts only the LM curve inward and the 
IS curve remains unchanged, bringing about yIS. If CC0 is shaped similarly to the IS curve yCC 
indicates a stronger reduction of output compared to yIS. 
 
 
Figure 2: Contractionary Monetary Policy 
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In a less formal approach proponents of the BLC seek to establish a direct link between the 
availability of bank loans and investment and consumption, (Hubbard 1995: 65). Some firms are 
dependent on bank loans because issuing corporate bonds involves large fixed costs for informing 
investors. This becomes relevant particularly for small and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs). Banks 
are capable of reducing the fixed costs of monitoring and are therefore in a better position to 
provide external financial means particularly to SMEs, (Diamond 1984: 393). Hence, any change 
in banks’ willingness to lend will influence debtors directly. The bigger the pool of bank-
dependent borrowers the more severe is the reduction of spending, e.g. investment spending, and 
income.  
 
Proponents of the BLC also describe circumstances where the suggested transmission mechanism 
is less effective, see for example Kashyap and Stein (1993: 14) and Freixas and Rochet (1997: 
165). If a central bank conducts an open market sale, nonbanks will pay for the additional bonds 
with their deposits. This affects banks because they are financed with demand deposits as a 
reservable form of finance. Other intermediaries financed by non-reservable forms, e.g. 
certificates of deposits, commercial papers and long-term debt, cannot be affected by the central 
banks’ operation although they provide services comparable to those of banks. Therefore, the 
BLC is significantly weakened if the share of loans provided by banks is small relative to the 
portion of credit supplied by nonbank intermediaries. I disagree with this argument, but I shall 
formulate the critique below.  
 
Mishkin (2006: 621) sums up the BLC in a nutshell: “Expansionary monetary policy, which 
increases bank reserves and bank deposits, increases the quantity of bank loans available. 
Because many borrowers are dependent on bank loans to finance their activities, this increase in 
loans will cause investment (and possibly consumer) spending to rise.” 
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II.3 Critique of the Bank Lending Channel 
II.3.1 The CC Curve is Not an Adequate Substitution of the IS Curve 
In the presented model of Bernanke and Blinder, Equation (3) is the starting point of my critique. 
When Bernanke and Blinder replace D for Rim )( , they insert elements from the money market 
equilibrium into the loan market equilibrium. This results in a curve of the demand for goods, 
commonly described as the IS curve and called the CC (credit and commodities) curve by 
Bernanke and Blinder. The CC curve thus does not solely refer to the loan market and its impact 
on the demand for goods, but also embraces the market for money. Departing from Bernanke and 
Blinder, an alternative approach would be to assume that the quantity of money does not vary on 
the IS curve. Thus, a simpler version for constructing the IS curve would arise by keeping D 
constant in (1). Similarly to (5) I can solve (1) for ρ as an implicit function of i , y , yielding,  
(5’) ),(
++
′= yiφρ , with
di
d
di
φφ
>
'd
. 
The positive impact of the interest rate via Rim )(  on the right hand side of (3) is missing in (1), 
suggesting that the implicit impact of i on ρ  is larger than that in Equation (5).6 Inserting (5’) 
into (4) I obtain  
(6’) y))(i,',( φiYy = . 
This curve, for which I employ the standard IS-notation, is flatter than the CC curve due to 
/did/di' φφ >d . Evidently, central bank policy has no direct impact on this curve. Changes of 
bank reserves, R, leave the curve unaffected.  
 
                                                 
6
  For example, if the bond interest rate decreases, the loan supply increases in (3) and (1). Due to m(i)R in (3) 
but not in (1), the loan supply stays lower and therefore the loan interest rate has to rise less to restore equilibrium. 
As result, the impact of i on ρ is larger.   
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Figure 3: The Problematic CC Curve 
 
Therefore, contractionary monetary policy changes R and shifts only the LM curve inwards as 
depicted by Equation (2). The outcome is the well-known result. There is no additional shift of 
the IS curve; monetary policy is not more contractionary than in IS/LM. It becomes clear that 
minor modifications of the model change the outcome significantly. This raises first doubts about 
the robustness of the BLC. 
II.3.2 Testing an Alternative Form of the Loan Demand Function 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) operate with the bank loan demand function ),,(
++−
= yiLLd ρ . What 
is problematic about this specification?  Due to the nonbank’s budget constraint, money demand 
and loan demand implicitly determine the bond supply, RyiLyiDB s −−=
++−+−
),,(),( ρ . 
Contractionary monetary policy reduces R because the central bank sells corporate bonds. 
Nonbanks in turn substitute restricted financial means by selling bonds to banks, sB  increases.  
 
But another equally plausible reaction by nonbanks would be to increase loans. When the central 
bank absorbs a share of the nonbanks’ financial means these turn to the banks and ask for more 
loans. Assume for simplicity's sake the extreme variant that the increase in Bs is solely financed 
by loans. This can be captured by modelling bond supply according to  
(7) ),,(
+−+
= yiBB s ρ , 
and determine loan supply from the nonbank’s balance sheet: 
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(8) RyiByiDLd −−=
+−++−
),,(),( ρ . 
Introducing (8) into (3), one obtains  
(3’) )−(==−−=
+−++−++−
τρλρ 1()(),),,(),( RimiLRyiByiDL sd .  
An open market sale (R decreases) leads to an increase in loan demand and forces an increase in 
ρ according to (3’). This repeats the finding of (5), where an inverse impact of R on ρ  has been 
found. However this impact does not only arise due to a reduction in the loan supply (the right 
hand side). This impact also arises due to an increase in loan demand via a reduction of R. 
Whether in equilibrium loans will increase or not becomes a complex question. Loan supply rises 
due to an increase in ρ  but sinks due to decreasing the R. A potential increase of the interest rate 
on bonds, i, may reduce loan supply and loan demand. Overall the equilibrium reaction of loans 
is ambiguous. Interestingly, the early work by Brunner and Meltzer came to the same conclusion, 
(Brunner and Meltzer 1966: 163; Brunner 1974 and Brunner and Meltzer 1968). The standard 
wisdom of their contribution is that the equilibrium level of loans increases only if money 
demand is insensitive to the increasing interest rate.   
 
Once this modification is introduced into the standard model, the negative impact of R on ρ  in 
Equation (5) becomes stronger. The reason is that a decrease in R additionally increases loan 
demand (and also decreases the loan supply) and thus forces a more pronounced rise of ρ , the 
interest rate on loans. In reaction to a decreasing R the downward drop of the CC curve in an 
(i/Y)-diagram is therefore more pronounced. This argument seems to strengthen the point made 
by Bernanke and Blinder, but it is in contrast to the description of the BLC. Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988: 437) state, in contrast to Brunner and Meltzer, that the inclusion of the credit market 
makes monetary policy more powerful because a central bank affects the real economy by 
changing the bond interest rate and the loan volume. However, the increased power of monetary 
policy does not relate to a reduction in the loan volume but an increase in the interest rate on 
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loans. Bernanke and Blinder’s shift of the CC curve is not well related to their argument of 
changes in R.7  
II.3.3 Money Demand and Money Supply are Lopsided 
Let us turn to the money demand function employed, ),(
+−
= yiDD d . The standard argument for 
an influence of the interest rate relates to the opportunity costs of holding money and to portfolio 
considerations. But these arguments would relate not only to the interest rate on bonds, i, but 
equally to the interest rate on loans, ρ . As the nonbank’s balance sheet shows, costs of holding 
money increase with dearer bank loans. Thus, ρ  reduces money demand financed by credit. An 
adequate modification would thus include the influence of ρ : ),,(
+−−
= yiDD d ρ . The same 
argument relates to the money multiplier. Banks have reason to reduce their reserves when loans 
are profitable.8 Thus, money supply is positively related to the interest rate on loans, ρ : 
RimD s ),(
++
= ρ . The money market equilibrium is represented by:  
(2’) RimyiD ),(),,(
+++−−
= ρρ .  
Apparently, a reduction of R may not only be balanced by an increase in i but also by a higher ρ . 
In an (i/Y)-diagram a higher ρ would shift the LM curve downward after the initial reduction of R 
shifted the LM curve upwards.9  
 
With the many additional shifts of curves as a result of the modifications it becomes arduous to 
draw straightforward conclusions from the model. A core reason is the choice of the graphical 
presentation with the interest rate on bonds, i, on the ordinate. The IS curve in its conventional 
logic represents the goods market’s reaction to overall finance conditions as determined by the 
money market. These conditions embrace both interest rates, i and ρ . Bernanke and Blinder 
                                                 
7
  We note in passing that similar notation and results follow when assuming that the central bank purchases 
government bonds and not corporate bonds. 
8
  Therefore, excess reserves should be given by: )−(=
−
−
τρε 1(), DiE . 
9
  An open market sale reduces R and increases i to balance the money market. The LM curve shifts upwards. 
But the increased bond rate diminishes the loan supply and raises ρ. The money market is restored when i sinks. 
Thus, the LM curve shifts again, downwards. Overall, the position of the LM curve would be unclear.  
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deviate from this standard argument. They include ρ  and the loan market separately in the 
analysis of IS, but they disregard ρ  when they model the money market.  
 
Assuming for simplicity's sake that loans and bonds are equally important for the goods market, 
Equation (4) could be written as 
−
)/2)+= ρiYy (( . This would allow the portrayal of the model in 
a ((i+ ρ )/ Y)-diagram. Suggesting also that interest rates for loans and bonds are equally important 
for the money market, I can simplify the money market equilibrium: 
(2’’) RimyiD )((),((
++−
)/2+=)/2+ ρρ . 
The LM curve obtains the standard positive slope with only R having an impact on its position. In 
essence, we end up with a simple IS/LM-model in a ((i+ ρ )/ Y)-diagram. Equilibrium on the loan 
and bond market are automatically obtained once IS and LM intersect.10 Therefore, once the 
IS/LM-equilibirium has been achieved with an equilibrium value for )/2+ ρi( , the individual 
values for i and ρ are determined so as to balance the loan and the bond market.  
 
This argument reveals that the inclusion of a market for loans by Bernanke and Blinder does not 
add much to the standard logic of IS/LM. In this standard logic loans and bonds had been 
aggregated into a composite market for financial means. Splitting up this market into two reveals 
how loans and bonds are substituting one another, but it does not add a mechanism of monetary 
transmission. 
II.3.4 The Logic of the IS Curve has been Missed 
Contractionary monetary policy raises i  and ρ  so that capital costs increase and investments are 
less attractive. This interest rate effect goes along with a reduction of money (deposits) and loans 
issued by banks. Advocates of the BLC claim that this volume effect provides an additional 
reason for decreased investments, and they state that the central bank impacts on the real 
economy by altering this loan volume.  
 
                                                 
10
  This result also holds when open market sales are carried out with publicly issued bonds.  
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But an impact of the loan volume on investment is not convincing. First, an exogenous decrease 
in the loan supply exerts no clear effect on investments, because banks can only achieve this if 
other assets are increased. Recall banks’ balance sheets: With excess reserve ( E ) given11, they 
would have to increase their holdings of corporate bonds. But this would provide nonbanks (as 
investors) with an alternative source of finance, providing no clear direction to the aggregate 
impact of such a policy.  
 
Loans are not what is needed for investment but rather savings. Apparently, there is no reason 
why reduced loans may lower savings, the driving forces of which we know to be 
macroeconomic income and interest rates. 
 
It would even be misleading to assume that savings constrain investments because such a 
reasoning misunderstands the logic of the IS curve. Any investment automatically creates the 
savings that are necessary for its execution. Any additional investment leads to increased private 
income. This might be saved. If it is consumed, a multiplier effect leads to increased income 
elsewhere until all of the initial increase in investment is saved elsewhere. This logic remains 
intact even if part of the income leads to increased taxation, because in this case public savings 
increase. Even in open economy the logic of the IS curve remains intact. Increased income may 
raise imports; these in turn increase capital imports, which are foreign savings. The idea that 
loans constrain investments appears convincing for an individual investor. But the 
macroeconomic logic of the IS curve suggests that such a constraint is not binding. 
II.3.5 Stock-Flow-Problems 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995: 40) explain: “Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) model of the bank 
lending channel suggested that open market sales by the Fed, which drain reserves and hence 
deposits from the banking system, would limit the supply of bank loans by reducing banks’ 
access to loanable funds. (…) (A) reduction in the supply of bank credit (…) is likely (…) to 
reduce real activity. ” 
                                                 
11
  An increase in excess reserves provides the classical example of a reduction of money supply that is not 
carried out by the central bank. But this increase generates a transmission process via relative prices. An additional 
effect via the volume of loans does not arise.  
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Deposits and loans are a stock variable: Reducing deposits by conducting tight monetary policy 
means reducing a stock, a variable expressed at a certain moment in time. In contrast, a flow 
variable is defined in units of time. Investment, savings and loanable funds are flow variables. In 
this context representatives of the BLC are not clear about how stocks are supposed to impact on 
flows. One potential link might arise by considering the stock of physical capital as another asset 
in the nonbank’s balance sheet. But this provides no clue for the proclaimed effect via volumes. 
Increased loans and corporate bonds are modelled so as to reflect increased deposits. The 
equilibrium has been determined such that the changes in these aggregates balance out. There is 
no reason why adjustments should thus spill over to the demand for physical capital. The only 
plausible impact on the stock of physical capital would, again, have to run via relative prices.   
 
Particularly in the liquidity trap proponents of the BLC accentuate the impact on the real 
economy by taking stock adjustments into consideration: an impact is claimed to arise only via a 
changing loan supply because the interest rate channel is ineffective. But the low interest rates 
render the holding of money attractive. The nonbank’s balance sheet reveals that nonbanks 
demand loans to hold deposits and not to bind borrowed money for an increase in the physical 
capital. Real activity remains unaffected.  
  
Therefore, once the real economy is stuck in a liquidity trap, my critique implies that even if the 
central banks are able to influence banks’ loan supply beyond an impact via relative prices, 
monetary policy is impotent in affecting the investment demand. 
II.3.6 Open Market Sale also Affects Nonbank Intermediaries 
If a central bank conducts an open market sale, banks are affected because they are financed with 
the deteriorating demand deposits. Kashyap and Stein (1993: 14) argue that the BLC is 
significantly weakened if nonbank intermediaries come into play. These are not financed by 
demand deposits and may counteract the diminishing loans supplied by banks. Instead of demand 
deposits they are financed by non-reservable forms such as certificates of deposits or commercial 
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papers.12 In a similar spirit, Bernanke and Gertler (1995: 41) explain that the BLC is weaker if 
banks find alternative sources of funding and this is seen to explain the alleged weakening of the 
BLC since the early 1980s. 
 
I disagree with this argument. Crucial is that all sorts of assets, including certificates of deposit, 
can be brought into play to reimburse the central bank for open market sales. That is, nonbanks 
are able to sell not only demand deposits but also certificates of deposits or commercial papers in 
exchange for the bonds from the open market sale. Therefore, nonbank intermediaries financed 
by commercial papers or certificates of deposits can also be affected by a tight monetary policy 
operation. The open market operations of a central bank influence all sources of finance of banks 
and nonbank intermediaries. 
II.4 Conclusion 
The discussion about how monetary impulses by the central bank are transmitted to the real 
economy has not come to an end. This paper contributes to the ongoing debate by questioning the 
existence of one of the monetary transmission mechanisms, i.e. the bank lending channel, and by 
formulating a critique highlighting six aspects.  
 
First, Bernanke and Blinder (1988: 437) state that “(…) the credit channel makes monetary policy 
more expansionary than in IS/LM (…)”. This conclusion is essentially based on the constructed 
substitute for the IS curve, the CC curve. I posit that the tricky construction of the CC curve 
obfuscates more than it reveals. Second, the BLC as presented by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) is 
based on a special form of the loan demand function. Once an alternative version is employed, 
the impact of an open market sale on loans is ambiguous, in line with the traditional work of 
Brunner and Meltzer in the late sixties. Third, I show that a plausible inclusion of the loan rate in 
the functions of money demand and supply brings about the textbook IS/LM results. Fourth, the 
                                                 
12
  Certificates of deposits are not subject to the reserve requirement. Puzzling, in a cashless world, as assumed 
by Bernanke and Blinder (1988: 436), funding without reserve requirements could lead to an unlimited increase of 
money because the multiplier increases to infinity. Therefore, the central bank loses control of the money stock. But 
the consequences of such a money supply for the BLC remain unclear. 
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BLC dismisses the logic of the IS curve by claiming that loans constrain investments. While this 
argument appears convincing for an individual investor, the macroeconomic logic of the IS curve 
suggests that such a constraint is not binding. Fifth, I see some stock-flow problems with 
deposits, loans and investment. While I concede that central banks may be able to adversely 
affect bank’s loan supply, this may have no impact on investments. Sixth, Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) explain that the BLC is weaker if banks find alternative sources of funding. From the 
macroeconomic perspective, I find this argument implausible because banks and nonbank 
intermediaries are all affected by a reduction in liabilities, be they deposits or certificates of 
deposits.
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III Review of the Empirical Research on the Bank Lending Channel 
III.1  Introduction 
This chapter aims at displaying the development of the empirical research concerning the 
existence of the BLC. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model and describe this channel for the first 
time, but the approach operates with lopsided loan demand, money demand and money supply 
functions as discussed in Chapter II. This invalidates the core idea of the BLC that potential 
changes in the supply of loans may affect aggregate demand for goods and services. A reduction 
of loans may restrict an individual investor, but the macroeconomic logic of the IS curve suggests 
such a constraint is not binding.  
 
Since 1988 academics have been using this model as a work horse to empirically address the 
question of the quantitative relevance of the BLC. Cecchetti (1995) and Hubbard (1995) 
summarize the overall evolution of the controversial debate since then. The data used for the 
research is mainly from the United States. The first generation of papers follows approaches by 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) from the United States. 
Based on the estimation of vector autoregression (VAR) models using aggregate macroeconomic 
time-series, numerous contributions have looked for the possible existence of a BLC in several 
European countries. In a VAR model, a number of variables are explained in terms of their own 
lags and those of other variables. Early contributions are made by Tsatsaronis (1995), Barran et 
al. (1996) and Stöß (1996), but identification problems arise. The findings of these papers are 
also consistent with monetary transmission mechanisms other than the BLC. These 
interpretations stress the impact of the bank loan demand instead of the loan supply, which is 
essential to the identification of the BLC. Shortcomings of aggregate time-series inspired 
academics to come up with a new approach using microeconomic datasets.  
 
In the review I focus on the more recent cohort of empirical investigations that, again, follow 
seminal papers by Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) on U.S. 
transmission mechanisms. It is crucial that these authors are the first to address the question using 
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individual bank balance sheet data for the U.S. Their approach is inspired by Gertler and Hubbard 
(1988) or Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) who apply disaggregated data on non-financial 
firms to test the cross-sectional implications of monetary policy actions.      
 
Apart from studies with microeconomic data, it is worth mentioning that empirical research on 
bank lending is still carried out with aggregate data, applying the estimation method of vector 
error correction model (VECM). A VECM is a VAR model which integrates long-term 
restrictions based on co-integration relations in the form of error-correction terms. This technique 
is developed by Johansen (1988, 1995) and first applied in Europe by de Bondt (1999) to the 
question of the BLC. Due to the aforementioned drawback of using aggregate data, the second 
strand of this recent literature is analyzed here only briefly by depicting an illustrative 
investigation.  
 
Economists from the rest of the world started to make use of data other than that from the U.S. 
Likewise, many central banks set in motion studies that examine how the monetary transmission 
mechanism works in their country or currency area. The existence of the BLC has also been 
examined because the channel is considered part of the textbook transmission mechanism. It is 
still a hotly debated and controversial issue. To my knowledge, there is no paper that reviews the 
evolution of the last decade. This review tries to fill this gap and focuses on European countries. 
The paper is divided in Section III.2, which reviews investigations in the spirit of Kashyap and 
Stein (1995, 2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000). Other empirical investigations with 
disaggregated data on European counties from the last decade are analyzed in Section III.3 and 
labelled further studies. Table 2-4 briefly document the results of the review. The paper 
concludes with summarizing remarks on the empirical research in Section III.4.    
 
III.2 Investigations in the Spirit of Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Kishan 
and Opiela (2000) 
The existence of the credit channel – the BLC and the balance sheet channel – has been tested by 
analyzing cross-sectional differences in types of credit, borrowers and lenders. Empirical research 
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has studied the different impact of monetary policy actions for non-bank debt such as commercial 
papers against bank loans (Kashyap, Lamont and Stein 1994, Oliner and Rudebusch 1996), small 
firms or households against (large) firms (Gertler and Gilchrist 1993, 1994) and small banks 
against large banks. Inspired by groundbreaking papers of Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and 
Peek and Rosengren (1995), research of the last decade has focused on different types of lenders. 
These differences rely on the extent of informational frictions in the financial sector which brings 
about different bank loan supply responses across banks. The underlying transmission 
mechanism, BLC, assumes the more difficult it is for a bank to compensate restrictive policy 
actions, the higher the information costs imposed by its suppliers of funds. For instance, an open 
market sale causes a deposit drain in banks’ balance sheet. In the logic of Modigliani-Miller, 
banks are able to tap alternative finance sources at no cost since the structure of liabilities does 
not matter. Once taking information asymmetries into account, this logic might not apply for 
banks. Bank lending and the asset side of the balance sheet may be affected if banks cannot offset 
the contraction shock without cost. In passing, the Modigliani-Miller-theorem not only refers to 
lenders but also to borrowers and claims the irrelevance of finance for them. Dropping the 
assumption of perfectly distributed information reveals limited opportunities for some borrowers 
to substitute bank loans when banks cut back lending. These debtors are bank-dependent and 
finance matters for them. Hubbard (1995, 1998) summarizes this strand of empirical research. 
Here, I focus on the most recent investigations that examine different types of lenders.      
 
The empirical literature addresses the question of how to estimate market imperfections due to 
information asymmetries by separating lenders in groups or classes. Common criteria for this 
separation are a bank’s asset size, capitalization and liquidity. These are mainly measured by total 
assets for size, the ratio of capital to assets for capitalization and the ratio of liquid assets such as 
securities or interbank deposits to assets for liquidity.   
 
Regarding size, Kashyap and Stein (1995) came up with the idea that small banks have more 
difficulty raising funds since they face higher information costs and/or a higher external finance 
premium than large banks. Therefore, they are less able to offset contractionary monetary policy 
actions and have to reduce their loan supply more sharply than large banks.  
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Using bank size as measure to generate cross-sectional differences is not precisely in line with 
theoretical models which stress the relevance of a borrower’s net worth. In this light, Peek and 
Rosengren (1995) argue that a bank’s capital may better serve as a proxy and de Bondt (1998) 
and Kishan and Opiela (2000) were the first to realize this idea in an empirical investigation for 
Europe and the U.S., respectively. The external finance premium of well capitalized banks should 
be lower than that of poorly capitalized banks, since they are less prone to moral hazard. Again, 
banks that face higher information costs ought to respond more strongly to policy actions. Yet, as 
Worms (2001) depicts, it may be problematic to use capitalization as an indicator. Banks also 
hold more capital because their risk exposure on the asset side might be higher as well. Hence, 
better capitalization may reflect higher risks and not lower.  
 
As suggested by Kashyap and Stein (2000) and tested for the U.S., the third criterion for 
unravelling the heterogeneity among banks is liquidity, since a liquidity buffer may help to shield 
loans from a restrictive policy measure. Worms (2001) again points out that banks facing 
particularly high information costs have an incentive to accumulate liquid assets. Moreover, it 
seems plausible that more risk averse banks have tighter lending standards and therefore prefer to 
be more liquid. Particularly, the loan demand of these banks might differ from other less liquid 
banks which provide riskier firms with funds. If the assumption of homogenous loan demand 
across the banking sector has to be dropped, it appears tricky to single out loan supply effects. So, 
liquidity as a discriminating variable is problematic as well.  
 
Subsequent to the description and the discussion of the criteria for sorting out the heterogeneity 
among lenders the presentation of studies working with disaggregated data takes place. 
 
Kashyap and Stein (1995) test cross-sectional differences between banks with different degrees 
of access to non-deposit financing (e.g., certificates of deposits). These differences stem from 
capital market imperfections. Under the assumption of homogeneous loan demand across banks, 
cross-sectional differences in loan behavior will reflect supply effects. Kashyap and Stein (1995) 
discovered that the effect of monetary policy on lending is more pronounced for those banks 
suffering from a higher degree of asymmetric information vis-à-vis its suppliers of funds. So the 
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researchers control for the ability of banks (here proxied by a bank’s asset size) to offset an 
outflow of deposits induced by an open market sale in order to provide bank loans. A bank’s 
asset size and therefore the ability to compensate the drain of deposits are linked to the loan 
supply and unrelated to the loan demand. The data is retrieved from all federally insured U.S. 
banks on loans, securities and deposits, and the researchers collected quarterly time series for the 
time period from 1972:Q1 - 1992:Q2. In their first step, Kashyap and Stein (1995) categorized 
banks with respect to the costs of rising external funds. As a proxy, they use banks’ total assets 
and claim that larger banks face lower costs of external finance. If small banks faced stronger 
difficulties in finding external finance, after a monetary policy tightening, they would reduce 
their loans by more than large ones. With respect to their estimation technique, the authors carry 
out the investigation by regressing the growth rate of deposits against the lagged change in the 
federal funds rate, the consumer price index (not seasonally adjusted) and GDP growth, which 
are taken from the Citibase databank. Kashyap and Stein (1995) repeat this procedure for each of 
the five bank size classes. This estimation method is carried out for dependent variables other 
than deposits – loans and securities. Kashyap and Stein (1995) do not label this method explicitly, 
but one could identify the approach as the distributed lag model because it assumes the effect of 
the independent variable on the dependent variable is distributed over time. Therefore, if the 
value of the independent variable at time t changes, the dependent variable experiences some 
immediate effect at time t and it also experiences delayed effects at times t + 1, t + 2 up to time t 
+ p, for some limit p. The majority of investigations reviewed here apply the autoregressive form 
of the distributed lag model. However, they find evidence that the loan supply of smaller banks is 
disproportionately affected by contractionary monetary policy because these banks have more 
difficulty substituting deposits for non-deposit sources of external finance. This study is seminal 
for the empirical investigations on the BLC and it follows the existing literature on how to test 
shocks to internal liquidity and investment spending of non-financial firms, which also face 
capital market imperfections.   
 
Since the majority of following studies rest on this approach by Kashyap and Stein, a critical 
remark is due: researchers claim to test the BLC but they fail to insulate this channel from the 
interest rate channel. Drawing conclusions about the existence of the BLC then turns problematic. 
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Insulation is important because one cannot exclude that contractionary monetary policy (e.g., an 
open market sale) induces banks to reduce the loan supply because bonds are an alternative asset 
which then become more attractive. The BLC states that the reduction of loan supply stems from 
a drain in deposits caused by the central bank. However, since banks adjust their portfolios with 
respect to relative prices, the results of Kashyap and Stein (1995) would also be in line with the 
interest rate channel. If one considers risk premiums and not only a bond rate as a representative 
financing rate in the interest rate channel, small banks face a higher premium than big banks 
because they also experience higher informational asymmetries on the capital markets. An open 
market sale would increase the bond rate and worsen the creditworthiness of smaller banks 
relative to big banks. Higher risk premium would then cause small banks curb their loan supply. 
As a consequence, this empirical approach does not corroborate the theoretical statement of 
proponents of the BLC concerning the impact on investment beyond relative prices. Only if 
researchers control for relative prices and prove that included relative prices are insignificant, 
could one make statements whether a (central bank-induced) deposit drain forces banks to reduce 
the loan supply. Investigations such as the study by Hernando and Martinez-Pagés (2001) or the 
research in Chapter IV suggest a possible solution of how to overcome this problem. 
 
Cecchetti (1995) also criticizes this empirical research because it finds additional support for 
capital market imperfection (not for firms but also for banks), instead of providing evidence of 
the quantitative relevance of the BLC. Instead, empirical research shows that banks cannot or do 
not shield the loan supply from monetary policy due to capital market imperfections (e.g., by 
issuing some securities such as certificates of deposits to offset an open market sale). This strand 
of investigations presents evidence that the Modigliani-Miller logic does not apply for banks and 
that finance “matters.” Yet, this evidence does not prove that monetary policy has effects beyond 
relative prices.  
 
Moreover, the monetary transmission mechanism does not end with changed bank lending. 
Kashyap and Stein (1995) examine only the first part of the mechanism that affects banks. As a 
result, they disregard the question to which extent the examined transmission impacts on 
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spending. These critical arguments hold for every investigation reviewed in this paper. 
Exceptions are explicitly noted.  
 
Table 2 and 3 provide a snapshot on reviewed papers that follow Kashyap and Stein (1995), 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) or Kishan and Opiela (2000). Following the brief summary in Table 2 
and 3 each paper is presented and examined en detail. 
 
Abbreviations used in Tables 2-4:  
L – loans L(-t) – lagged 
loans 
FFR – federal funds 
rate 
C – currency D – deposits 
CD – 
certificates 
of deposits 
Sec – securities CPI – consumer 
price index 
GDP – gross domestic 
product 
SIZ – size 
LIQ – 
liquidity 
CAP – 
capitalization 
AFF – affiliation IRC – insufficient insulation 
from the interest rate channel 
RE – untested link to 
the real economy 
MMR – 
money 
market rate 
ALT – 
alternative 
investigation 
method 
LIBOR – London 
Inter-bank Offered 
Rate 
TD – time deposits GMM – generalized 
method of moments  
Ita – Italy 
UK – 
United 
Kingdom 
Spa – Spain 
Bel – Belgium 
 
Neth – Netherlands 
EMU – European 
Monetary Union 
Ger – Germany 
Fra – France 
VECM – vector error 
correction model 
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Variables 
Authors 
Country 
Sample 
Dependent 
variable 
Lagged 
dependent 
variables 
(Short-
term) 
interest 
rate 
Bank 
balance 
sheet 
items 
Control 
variables 
Bank 
chara
cteris
tics 
Result: 
Which bank 
characteristic 
is 
significant? 
Asserted 
evidence 
for the 
BLC 
Comment 
Kashyap 
and Stein 
(1995)  
USA 
1972:Q1-
1992:Q2 
L - FFR 
C, Sec, 
D 
CPI, 
GDP 
SIZ SIZ Yes IRC. RE 
Brissimis et 
al. (2001) 
Greece 
1995:M1-
2000:M12 
L L(-t) 
MMR; 
ALT: 
loan – 
bond rate 
D 
CPI, 
GDP 
SIZ, 
LIQ 
LIQ; ALT: 
SIZ and LIQ 
Yes; 
ALT: 
Yes 
No GMM. 
IRC; ALT: not 
in line with the 
BLC. RE 
Hernando 
and 
Martinez-
Pagés 
(2001) 
Spain 
1991:Q1-
1998:Q4 
L L(-t) MMR D 
CPI, 
GDP 
SIZ, 
LIQ , 
CAP 
None 
No; ALT: 
No 
IRC; ALT: 
BLC is singled 
out. RE 
Topi and 
Vimunen 
(2001) 
Finland 
1995:Q1-
2001:Q4 
L L(-t) MMR - 
CPI, 
GDP 
SIZ, 
LIQ , 
CAP 
None No IRC. RE 
Westerlund 
(2003) 
Sweden 
1998:M1-
2003:M6 
L L(-t) MMR 
D, CD, 
Sec 
(CD, 
Sec) 
SIZ, 
LIQ , 
CAP 
SIZ, LIQ, 
CAP 
Yes IRC. RE 
Kashyap 
and Stein 
(2000) 
USA 
1976:Q1-
1993:Q2 
L L(-t) FFR - GDP LIQ LIQ Yes IRC. RE 
Bichsel and 
Perrez 
(2005) 
Switzerla
nd 
1996:Q1-
2003:Q1 
L L(-t) LIBOR - GDP 
LIQ, 
CAP 
CAP Yes IRC. RE 
Kishan and 
Opiela 
(2000) 
USA 
1980:Q1-
1995:Q4 
L L(-t) 
FFR / 
Bernanke
-Mihov 
D, TD, 
Sec 
- 
SIZ, 
CAP 
SIZ and 
CAP 
Yes 
No control 
variables. IRC. 
RE 
Loupias et 
al. (2001) 
France 
1993:Q1-
2000:Q4 
L L(-t) MMR - 
CPI, 
GDP 
SIZ, 
LIQ, 
CAP 
LIQ Yes IRC. RE 
Table 2: Investigations in the Spirit of Kashyap and Stein (1995, 
2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) (part 1) 
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Variables 
Authors 
Country 
Sample Dependent 
variable 
Lagged 
dependent 
variables 
(Short-
term) 
interest 
rate 
Bank 
balance 
sheet 
items 
Control 
variables 
Bank 
chara
cteris
tics 
Result: 
Which bank 
characteristic 
is 
significant? 
Asserted 
evidence 
for the 
BLC 
Comment 
Gambacorta 
et al. (2001) 
Italy 
1986:Q1-
1998:Q4 
L L(-t) MMR - 
CPI, 
GDP 
SIZ, 
LIQ, 
CAP 
LIQ Yes IRC. RE 
De Haan 
(2003) 
Holland 
1991:Q1-
1998:Q4 
L L(-t) MMR - 
CPI, 
GDP 
SIZ, 
LIQ, 
CAP 
SIZ, LIQ, 
CAP  
Yes IRC. RE 
Worms 
(2001) 
Germany 
1992:Q1-
1998:Q4 
L L(-t) MMR  
bank-indiv. 
income, 
default-risk 
measure 
SIZ, 
LIQ, 
CAP 
LIQ, CAP Yes IRC. RE 
De Bondt 
(1998) 
Fra, Ger, 
Neth, Bel, 
Ita, UK 
1990-1995 
L - 
MMR / 
monetary 
conditions 
index 
- GDP 
SIZ, 
LIQ 
SIZ, 
LIQ 
Fra: No 
Ger: Yes 
Neth: Yes 
Bel: Yes 
Ita: No / Yes 
UK: No 
IRC. RE 
Favero et 
al. (1999) 
Fra, Ger, 
Ita, Spa 
1992 
L - - 
Bank 
reserves 
- 
SIZ, 
LIQ None 
Fra: No 
Ger: No 
Ita: No 
Spa: No 
No control 
variables. IRC. 
RE 
Altunbas et 
al (2002) 
EMU 
1991-1999 
L - MMR 
interban
k D, Sec 
GDP 
SIZ, 
CAP 
SIZ, CAP Yes IRC. RE 
Ehrmann et 
al. (2001) 
Fra, Ger, 
Ita, Spa 
1992-1999 
L L(-t) MMR - 
CPI, 
GDP 
SIZ, 
LIQ, 
CAP 
LIQ Yes IRC. RE 
Table 3: Investigations in the Spirit of Kashyap and Stein (1995, 
2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) (part 2)  
 
Brissimis et al. (2001) conduct an empirical investigation for Greece by using bank level, 
monthly panel data for the period from 1995 to 2000. In the first step the researchers apply the 
aforementioned method by Kashyap and Stein (1995). Brissimis et al. (2001) test bank 
characteristics such as bank size (proxied by total assets) and “balance sheet strength” or liquidity 
(ratio of cash, deposits with other banks and securities to assets). In contrast to bank size, 
liquidity matters in Greece since results indicate that more liquid banks can insulate their loan 
supply from changes in monetary policy.  
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Brissimis et al. (2001) also apply an alternative estimation technique: the linear single error 
correction model. Thereby, they directly estimate the loan supply function by including deposits 
and the interest rate spread between the loan and bond rate. This function is aimed to be in line 
with the loan supply function in the influential paper of Bernanke and Blinder (1988), but this is 
only partly true since Bernanke and Blinder operate with an altered loan supply function; instead 
of deposits, the equilibrium on the money market is used to rewrite the loan supply and, hence, 
the equilibrium on the loan market. Bernanke and Blinder make use of this new loan supply 
function to construct a substitute for the conventional IS curve that includes the loan market 
equilibrium. When Bernanke and Blinder replace deposits for money supply, they insert elements 
from the money market equilibrium into the loan market equilibrium. The CC curve as substitute 
for the conventional IS curve does not solely refer to the loan market. With this trick, Bernanke 
and Blinder model the BLC and claim that this channel has an additional affect on real activity 
since central banks now shift the LM and the CC curve when changing money supply. Hence, 
this modified loan supply function is crucial for the BLC while the presented and used function 
by Brissimis et al. (2001) is less problematic and vital for the existence of the BLC. In their 
regression, bank characteristics (size and liquidity) are integrated and multiplied with deposits 
because they also shift the loan supply function. According to Brissimis et al. (2001), if loans and 
bonds are perfect substitutes and thus the spread of rates is zero, there is no BLC. However, 
results show that the spread is positive and significant and that size and liquidity matter. Larger 
and more liquid banks can shield their loan portfolio from changes in monetary policy. 
Additionally, the researchers fail to perform the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation since estimators may be inconsistent and inefficient due to the inclusion of lagged 
loans as an independent variable. Usually, the GMM estimation is applied as the following 
investigation shows.             
 
Hernando and Martinez-Pagés (2001) also apply the Kashyap and Stein (1995)-estimation-
technique for Spain. They use a quarterly panel dataset of 216 depository institutions operating in 
Spain for the period between 1991 and 1998. Researchers tested for three bank characteristics: 
size and liquidity, which are similarly defined as mentioned above; capitalization as ratio of 
capital; and reserves to total assets excluding liquid assets and loans to the domestic public 
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sector. Due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable loans on the right-hand-side, the 
estimator within is inconsistent and ordinary least squares estimation cannot be applied. Thus, the 
GMM estimation is used to address this problem as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). This 
method ensures efficiency and consistency of the estimators provided that the instruments are 
adequately defined to take into account the serial correlation properties of the residuals. The 
method embarks on taking first differences of the model and estimating the resulting model by 
instrumental variables. As instruments are often used the following variables: lags 2 and 3 of the 
second difference of the logarithm of loans, lag 2 of the first difference of the bank characteristics 
and lag 2 of the first difference of the interaction terms such as bank characteristic(s) multiplied 
by the monetary policy indicator. The macroeconomic variables GDP and inflation control for 
effects stemming from the loan demand and are assumed exogenous. This estimator brings about 
more robust estimates if two conditions are fulfilled: the absence of the second-order serial 
autocorrelation in residuals and valid instrument variables. In order to meet these conditions, 
there is consensus to indicate AR1 and AR2 tests for the first-order and second-order 
autocorrelation and to run the Sargan test for the independence of the instruments. Using the 
GMM estimator, Hernando and Martinez-Pagés (2001) cannot find differences in the response of 
loan growth to three-month money market rates (as a policy indicator) for Spanish banks of 
different sizes or different degrees of capitalization. Regarding liquidity, they find some evidence 
that less liquid banks are more responsive to changes in the policy indicator than liquid banks. 
Hernando and Martinez-Pagés (2001) also break down total loans to loans to firms, consumer 
loans and mortgage loans. They fail to observe significant asymmetric responses – among liquid 
and less liquid banks – by these types of loans to a monetary policy shock. Hence, they come to 
the conclusion that the differential response of aggregated loans among more and less liquid 
banks is rather explained by the composition of bank lending and not by actual difference in the 
loan supply response.  
 
Hernando and Martinez-Pagés (2001) also perform an alternative approach, based on the 
response to an exogenous shock to deposits. This shock stems from the tax-induced expansion of 
mutual funds in Spain in this period. Mutual funds shares become attractive substitutes for 
deposits because the tax on capital gains from those shares was reduced and investors shifted 
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their financial means from bank deposits to money market and fixed-income mutual funds. The 
crucial consequences from this innovation are that it is not driven by monetary policy and interest 
rates and that it brings about reduced deposits. Loan demand remains unaffected by this deposit-
reducing shock. Therefore, any impact of the shock on loan growth can be interpreted as a supply 
effect and, consequently, can be taken as evidence in favor of the BLC. This empirical approach 
is particularly interesting since it simulates that the interest channel is ineffective because relative 
prices remain unchanged. The effectiveness of the BLC on the real economy would then depend 
on this direct quantitative impact of deposits on the loan supply. Strikingly, Hernando and 
Martinez-Pagés (2001) find no evidence that the sizeable reduction in deposits affects the ability 
of even smaller, less liquid and less capitalized banks to satisfy loan demand.  
 
Following Kashyap and Stein (1995), Topi and Vimunen (2001) test the BLC in Finland. By 
using quarterly panel data from 1995 to 2001, the researchers apply the GMM estimation and 
find no statistical evidence for the BLC. More precisely, they do find support for the hypothesis 
that GDP growth, inflation and the Bank of Finland tender rate/ECB’s main refinancing rate (as 
an indicator of monetary policy) and lagged bank loan growth explain the dependent variable, log 
differences of bank loans. Moreover, smaller, less liquid or capitalized banks should face 
difficulties in tapping alternative financing sources to maintain the loan supply when the central 
bank induces bank deposits to decrease. The inclusion of proxies for information costs such as 
size, liquidity and capitalization of Finnish banks does not bring about significant results. Thus, 
Topi and Vimunen (2001) conclude that heterogeneity among banks does not matter and that the 
BLC lacks statistical support. They include a dummy variable for the state loan guarantees which 
enters significantly in their regressions, indicating that the government support for the entire 
banking sector might have contributed to the increase in the growth rate of loans.     
 
Westerlund (2003) scrutinizes Sweden by using a panel of monthly disaggregated bank balance 
sheet data for the period of 1998:M1 to 2003:M6. Separating banks by asset size, liquidity and 
capitalization, Westerlund applies the autoregressive distributed lag model (and GMM 
estimation) and therefore uses lagged loans, changes in the three month Stockholm interbank 
offered rate as indicator of monetary policy, and real GDP and CPI to explain the logarithm of 
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bank loans. Westerlund (2003) also includes logarithm of certificates of deposits and securities to 
control for alternative lending opportunities. The main findings are: first, the Swedish central 
bank affects loans since banks are constrained by the limited access to external finance to 
compensate the drain in deposits; secondly, GDP and CPI should control for demand effects, so 
that Westerlund assumes homogenous loan demand across banks which leads to his conclusion 
that the central bank shifts the loan supply; thirdly, the degree of banks’ response to monetary 
policy depends on separating characteristics such as size, liquidity and capitalization; fourthly, 
firms and households in Sweden seem to be constrained by a drop in the loan supply so that 
Westerlund concludes that real spending might be affected and the BLC at work.             
 
In the empirical literature of the BLC, Kashyap and Stein (2000) write a seminal paper that is 
also widely cited. Using panel data at the individual bank level from 1976:Q1 till 1993:Q2, the 
main result is that central banks have a stronger affect on lending of those banks with less liquid 
balance sheets. Put differently, less liquidity-constrained banks use their buffer stock to shield 
loan portfolios from monetary policy shocks. The ratio of securities plus federal funds and assets 
define size of the buffer stock. Each quarter all federally insured banks provide information about 
their “condition and income” in Call Reports to the Federal Reserve. As in Kashyap and Stein 
(1995), the researchers test effects of monetary policy on banks of different sizes. Banks are 
organized in categories depending on asset sizes of balance sheets. A two-step regression 
approach is applied. First, they run cross-sectional regression separately for each size class and 
each time period, with a logarithmic form of loans as the dependent variable and lagged loans in 
logarithmic form, “balance sheet strength” (i.e., the buffer stock or measure of liquidity 
constraints as ratio of securities and federal funds to assets for a given size class) and a Federal 
Reserve-district dummy variable to control for geographical factors as an independent variable. 
In a second step, the estimators of the “balance sheet strength” of former regressions are used as 
dependent variables in time series regressions. The right-hand-side is a contemporaneous and 
lagged monetary policy indicator, lagged real GDP growth and a linear time trend. This two-step 
approach encounters the simultaneity issue since bank lending is affected by demand and supply 
shocks. Given that all banks face the same demand shock at one point in time, differences in bank 
lending mirrors only differences in the supply. The estimators of the “balance sheet strength” of 
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former regressions are estimated cross-sectionally and measure these differences. Certainly, it is 
important to know for which size of banks monetary policy matters most. It is also fruitful to 
discover that the buffer stock shields loans from adjusting because banks that hold liquid assets 
are better able to respond to adverse shocks. However, this paper focuses on the influence of 
monetary policy on bank lending in general and fails to insulate the BLC. It is not clear why there 
is an additional impact of the central bank on the economy beyond the interest rate channel. 
Identical results are expected if one tests the interest rate channel since this transmission 
mechanism also encompasses adjustments of the loan rate and, hence, loans. In a nutshell, 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) fail to empirically insulate the additional impact stated by proponents 
of the BLC.   
 
Bichsel and Perrez (2005) follow the aforementioned approach by Kashyap and Stein (2000), but 
test the BLC for Switzerland instead of the U.S. Their unbalanced, quarterly panel and bank level 
data is obtained from the Swiss National Bank for the period 1996:Q1 till 2003:Q1. An important 
extension is made by Bichsel and Perrez (2005) because they not only test for liquidity but also 
for capital base, defined as the ratio between excess minus required capital. They find support for 
the BLC. Liquidity, in contrast to capital, does not constrain bank lending in the case of changes 
in monetary policy stance. That is, better capitalized but not more liquid banks shield loan 
portfolios from impulses of the Swiss National Bank. Yet, as Bichsel and Perrez (2005) admit, 
the implication of the results for monetary policy is limited due to the concentrated banking 
market and the small number of undercapitalized banks in Switzerland. 
 
Kishan and Opiela (2000) also find support for the existence of the BLC in the U.S. by using 
quarterly data on balance sheet items of federally insured commercial banks from 1980:Q1 till 
1995:Q4. While Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) focus on the bank (asset) size and liquidity, 
Kishan and Opiela (2000) use the bank size and the bank capital leverage ratio (i.e., equity capital 
to total asset ratio) as the differentiating characteristics in the banking sector. They stress the role 
of bank capital in discouraging excessive risk-taking and its function as an indicator of bank 
health, since capital can absorb various shocks to assets. Therefore, bank capital links regulatory 
and stabilization policy. Relying on Call Reports, Kishan and Opiela retrieve data on loans, 
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securities, demand deposits, large time deposits and capital. Federal funds rates and the 
Bernanke-Mihov indicator13 proxy monetary policy. After dividing banks into six asset 
categories, a further subdivision is executed in three capital leverage ratio groups. For each size 
and each leverage ratio, Kishan and Opiela (2000) regress the growth rate of various types of 
loans on four lagged values of itself, four lagged values of the change in the federal funds rate (or 
in the Bernanke-Mihov indicator) and the current period growth in large time deposits and in 
securities. The latter variables, time deposits and securities, ought to control for “funding” effects 
on loans within each size and leverage ratio group. They find that small and undercapitalized 
banks tend to respond mostly to monetary policy. Additionally, Kishan and Opiela (2000) test the 
responsiveness of time deposits to money market rate changes. Insignificant results for small 
undercapitalized banks support their hypothesis that these banks do not want to – or are not able 
to – sell time deposits to finance the Fed-induced drain of demand deposits. It appears odd that 
they fail to control for the loan demand by inclusion of GDP and CPI, as the majority of 
investigators do. Therefore, Kishan and Opiela (2000) cannot convincingly assume that the loan 
demand faced by all banks is homogenous. However, Kishan and Opiela (2000) have an unusual 
understanding of the interest rate channel because they state that the supply of loans does not 
adjust to monetary policy. Loans are banks’ assets and therefore a part of their portfolio. If one 
includes banks and bank loans in the traditional IS/LM analysis with assets money and bonds, 
monetary policy affects interest rates and sets portfolio adjustments in motion. That is, banks 
modify both assets securities and loans. It appears erroneous to conclude from this view on the 
interest rate channel that one can find evidence for the existence of the BLC if the loan supply 
changes after a monetary impulse from the central bank.  
 
For France, Loupias et al. (2001) test the existence of the BLC and separate banks by size, 
liquidity and capitalization. They retrieve quarterly panel data on bank balance sheets over the 
period from 1993 to 2000 and the estimation method follows Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000). In 
order to account for the autoregressive nature of the model and for the possible endogeneity of 
bank characteristics, Loupias et al. (2001) use the GMM estimator with the following 
                                                 
13
  This indicator is computed using federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, total reserves and other 
variables such as real GDP. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) explain in detail their method.   
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instruments: the second and third lags of the quarterly growth rate of loans, the second lag of the 
bank characteristics and the first difference of the three-month interbank interest rate (as indicator 
of monetary policy). Contrary to the results for the U.S. displayed by Kashyap and Stein (1995, 
2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000), Loupias et al. (2001) only find support for the hypothesis 
that liquidity affects bank lending. Size and capitalization do not matter in France.     
 
Gambacorta (2001) corroborates the findings of Loupias et al. (2001) by using Italian panel data 
covering the period from 1986:Q1 till 1998:Q4. Their approach is also based on Kashyap and 
Stein (1995, 2000), with the interest rate on repurchase agreements between the Bank of Italy and 
eligible banks as monetary policy indicator.   
  
De Haan (2003) applies the same estimation technique but uses individual bank data from 
Netherlands for the period 1990:Q1 – 1998:Q4. The author finds evidence of the BLC in Holland, 
but only when loans without government guarantee are singled out. This negative effect of 
monetary policy on unsecured loans particularly affects smaller, less liquid and less capitalized 
banks.    
 
Worms (2001) executes the approach by Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) in combination with the 
GMM estimation for Germany and finds evidence for the existence of the BLC. As in many other 
European countries, evidence of former studies is inconclusive. Worms contributes to the existing 
literature by using individual balance sheet information, retrieving quarterly instead of annual 
macrodata and monthly balance sheet information from 1992-1998 and taking into account the 
structure of the German banking sector. With respect to control variables, Worms (2001) is 
innovative since he does not include GDP and inflation to control for loan demand effects as the 
mainstream literature applies. Instead, he includes the logarithm of a bank-individual income 
variable and a bank-individual default-risk measure. The first variable is proxied by an average of 
real incomes of nine production sectors and the private households. The latter variable is captured 
by a sectoral average of the number of insolvencies. His main finding is that bank loans decrease 
following an increase in the three-month interest rate – the lower the share of short-term 
interbank deposits to total assets. In contrast to U.S., the size of banks does not matter. It 
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becomes significant only when the author controls for interbank deposits or when very small 
banks are excluded from the sample. Worms (2001) explains the result with the special structure 
in the banking sector. Interbank deposits capture the close interbank link in the sector of credit 
cooperatives and savings banks in Germany. In case of a restrictive monetary policy measure, 
financial means are channeled from a large super-ordinate central institution to their affiliated 
smaller bank. Other bank characteristics such as liquidity and capitalization are significant, 
indicating that more liquid and better capitalized German banks are able to shield their loan 
portfolios from contractionary monetary policy action. Yet, concerning liquidity, one has to 
remark that short-term interbank deposits are the main component of a bank’s liquid assets and 
particularly the very small ones. Consequently, an average bank does not reduce liquidity assets 
other than short-term interbank deposits to moderate policy measures on loans.  
 
On the level of single European countries, de Bondt (1998) is the first empirical contribution to 
question the existence of the BLC in Europe. So far, contributions have only been made in the 
U.S. so de Bondt mainly follows Kashyap and Stein (1995) to test the BLC in Germany, 
Belgium, Netherlands, U.K., Italy and France. He focuses on the bank characteristics of size and 
liquidity and retrieves disaggregated bank level panel data for the years 1990-1995. Changes in 
loans are regressed on changes in short-term interest rates (as an indicator of the stance of 
monetary policy), changes in rates multiplied with the share of liquid assets over deposits and 
money market funding (liquidity), changes in rates multiplied with (the log of) total assets (size), 
changes in rates multiplied with liquidity and size and percentage change in real GDP growth. In 
Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, de Bondt finds support for the BLC, while in U.K., 
France and Italy no significant effects are observed. De Bondt also replaces the short-term 
interest rate as a proxy by a monetary conditions index which additionally takes into account 
dollar exchange rate fluctuations. Results seem to confirm the existence of the BLC in France and 
Italy. In U.K., results still show no corroboration of the BLC.       
 
Favero et al. (1999) is also one of the earliest empirical investigations of the BLC in France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain by using individual bank balance sheet data for the year 1992. The 
researchers choose 1992 to cancel out possible demand effects stemming from major output 
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fluctuations which can be observed, for instance, in 1993 but not in 1992. Applying the 
estimation method of ordinary least squares heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, Favero 
et al. (1999) separate banks in ten groups according to their size. Favero et al. estimate the 
equation with the percentage change in bank loans from 1991 to 1992 as a dependent variable 
and percentage change in bank reserves over the same period (as proxy for the stance of 
monetary policy) and the ratio of cash, securities and reserves to assets at the end of 1991, 
multiplied with change in reserves as independent variable. Overall, they do not find evidence for 
the BLC in these four countries. Small banks across Germany, Italy and France provide more 
loans in case of a restrictive monetary policy and measure and liquidity helps to bolster this 
expansion. Only large banks in Germany use liquidity as a buffer and shield loans from monetary 
policy actions. In any country, the lending of other banks does not respond to monetary policy. 
Despite picking the year 1992, Favero et al. might insufficiently control for loan demand effects 
by not including variables such as GDP and inflation, as other studies subsequent to this 
investigation carry out. Consequently, their results may suffer from an identification puzzle.   
 
Altunbas et al. (2002) mainly follow the approaches of de Bondt (1998) and Kishan and Opiela 
(2000). Therefore, they use annual (panel) bank balance sheets or individual bank level data from 
1991 to 1999 for the European Monetary Union (EMU) and for individual countries. Altunbas et 
al. (2002) retrieve data on loans, GDP, securities, interbank borrowings (as a proxy for time 
deposits) and deposits to changes in money market rates, which serve as a proxy for the stance of 
monetary policy. To control for “funding” effects on loans, Altunbas et al. (2002) use securities 
and interbank deposits. GDP controls for demand factors since they aim to identify the BLC. The 
regression models are estimated using the random effects panel data approach. They follow 
Kishan and Opiela (2000) and categorize banks in classes regarding asset size and “capital 
strength” (i.e., equity capital to total asset ratio). Altunbas et al.’s (2002) main result is that – 
irrespective of their size – undercapitalized (i.e., the ratio of capital strength is less than 5 
percent) banks’ lending tends to respond more to a monetary impulse from the central bank. In 
the EMU, the BLC is mainly transmitted via undercapitalized banks in smaller banking systems.         
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Ehrmann et al. (2001) conduct an investigation involving not a single-country but aggregated 
annual data from France, Germany, Italy and Spain for the period of 1992 – 1999. They also 
apply the aforementioned method by Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and GMM estimation, and 
explain the contrasting results with reduced information asymmetries in these four countries, 
which are proxied by size, liquidity and capitalization. Again, in the U.S. small and 
undercapitalized banks show the strongest response to restrictive monetary policy, while in 
Europe this outcome can only be observed for less liquid banks. Ehrmann et al. (2001) came up 
with the argument that the structure of the banking sector affects the distributional effect of the 
monetary policy on bank lending. In contrast to the U.S., analyzed European counties are 
characterized by a lower number of bank failures, a stronger governmental role and bank 
networks. In short, the structure of the banking sector helps reduce informational frictions so that 
banks show muted reactions in their lending behavior. These aspects might explain why size and 
capitalization do not matter.         
III.3  Further Investigations 
Table 4 summarizes the empirical research which does not follow Kashyap and Stein or Kishan 
and Opiela. Following Table 4 investigations are presented and examined. 
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Authors 
Country 
Sample 
Methodology Variables 
Result: Which 
bank 
characteristic 
is significant? 
Asserted 
evidence for 
the BLC 
Comment 
Farinha and 
Marques 
(2001) 
Portugal 
1991:Q1-
1998:Q4 
Ordinary Least 
Square  
L, MMR, D, 
CPI, loan and 
bond rate, 
CAP 
CAP Yes 
Unsolved 
identification 
problem. RE 
Kaufmann 
(2001) 
Austria 
1991:Q1-
1998:Q4 
Bayesian 
Framework; 
Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
L, L(-t), 
MMR, D, 
CPI, GDP 
SIZ and LIQ 
LIQ in times 
of economic 
slowdown 
Yes IRC. RE 
Frühwirth-
Schnatter 
and 
Kaufmann 
(2003) 
Austria 
1990:Q1-
1998:Q4 
Bayesian 
Framework; 
Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
L, MMR, C, 
Sec, D, CPI, 
GDP, State of 
the economy, 
(To be 
estimated) 
Different 
bank groups  
_ 
Weak 
support 
_ 
Ashcraft 
(2006) 
USA 
1976:Q1-
1999:Q4 
Ordinary Least 
Square 
L, L(-t), FFR, 
D, CPI, GDP, 
SIZ, LIQ, 
CAP, 
Affiliation 
SIZ, LIQ, 
CAP, 
Affiliation 
Weak 
support due 
to the 
irrelevance 
of the BLC 
for the RE 
IRC 
Huang 
(2003) 
UK 
1975:Q1-
1999:Q4 
Autoregressive 
distributed lag 
model with 
GMM 
L, Clearing 
banks’ base 
rate, 
inventories, 
debt-asset 
ratio (SIZ), 
vol. of debt 
SIZ Yes IRC 
Hülsewig et 
al. (2001) 
Germany 
1975:Q1-
1998:Q4 
VECM 
Bank equity, 
(loan rate- 
MMR), CPI, 
GDP 
_ Unclear 
Identification 
puzzle 
remains 
Table 4: Further Investigations 
 
Review of the Empirical Research on the Bank Lending Channel 
 
 43 
Farinha and Marques (2001) use Portuguese microdata from 1991:Q1 to 1998:Q4 and depart 
from the mainstream literature where the estimation method relies on the reduced form equation 
with variables in differences. Essentially, loans are the dependent variable while lagged loans, a 
monetary policy indicator, interaction terms such as a policy indicator multiplied by bank 
characteristic(s) size, liquidity, capitalization and macroeconomic variables such as GDP and 
inflation are “on the right-hand-side of the equation.” Instead, they test the BLC in Portugal by 
suggesting an alternative technique that aims to estimate the loan supply directly with variables in 
levels. Farinha and Marques (2001) assume that at the bank level deposits are widely determined 
by the central bank and are exogenous. This is also valid for the bond interest rate since banks are 
price-takers in the market for securities. The reduced form equation consists of the logarithm of 
real loans as the dependent variable and the log of real GDP, inflation, real deposits, the 
interaction term (real deposits times bank characteristic(s)) and the interest rate on bonds. Farinha 
and Marques (2001) identify the loan supply curve by including an element they consider to only 
drive the demand side: the log of real GDP. The bank loan demand curve can also be singled out 
since real deposits determine the supply curve as an additional regressor. As shown in Chapter II, 
the loan demand seems to be ill-defined in the seminal paper by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). 
Correcting this function by explicitly defining the bond function in the first step and the loan 
demand as an implicit function in line with the budget constraint of nonbanks in the second, 
brings about a loan demand dependent on deposits. Therefore, the identification problem is not 
solved as Farinha and Marques (2001) claim. However, the researchers apply the ordinary least 
squares approach and regress (the log of) real bank loans against (the log of) real deposits and 
real capital, (the log of) CPI, the Portuguese money market rate Lisbor, and the bond and bank 
loan interest rate. Additionally, Lisbor, (the log of) real deposits and real capital are multiplied 
with bank characteristic(s). Their approach is very similar to the method chosen in Chapter IV 
where a cross-section and a panel analysis are performed. In my investigation the identification 
problem is solved by explicitly taking into account the bank loan supply: the data is provided by 
the World Economic Forum which asks business professionals in many countries, “How easy is it 
to obtain a bank loan in your country with only a good business plan and no collateral?” Contrary 
to non-supportive results of my investigation, Farinha and Marques (2001) find evidence for the 
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BLC in Portugal and that the channel may be more important for less capitalized banks. Size and 
liquidity appear irrelevant.        
 
As for Austria, Kaufmann (2001) investigates both cross-sectional asymmetry (related to bank-
specific characteristics such as size and liquidity) and asymmetries over time (potentially related 
to the overall state of the economy) in Austrian bank lending reaction to monetary policy. The 
first type of asymmetry is accounted for by including interaction terms as executed by the 
aforementioned studies, and the second type is captured by latent state-dependent parameters. 
Estimation is cast into a Bayesian framework and the posterior inference is obtained by applying 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation methods. Kaufmann (2001) uses quarterly panel data 
from individual bank balance sheets for the period of 1990:Q1 – 1998:Q4. The results display a 
significant asymmetric effect of Austrian three-month interest rate changes over time on bank 
loans. During economic recovery, lagged interest rate changes have no significant effect on 
lending. Interestingly, the effects are significant during an economic slowdown and liquidity 
emerges as the bank characteristic that determines cross-sectional asymmetry. Again, size does 
not matter as a proxy for frictions in financial markets stemming from informational 
asymmetries. 
 
A bank’s exposure to asymmetric information is not directly observable. In their empirical 
assessment for Austria, Frühwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann (2003) depart from the mainstream 
literature since the bank characteristics of size, liquidity and capitalization are often used as 
proxies for informational frictions, but yet appear less relevant in Europe to sort out whether 
banks respond differently to monetary policy measures. One explanation for this different result 
from the U.S. is the aforementioned structure of the banking sector. However, Frühwirth-
Schnatter and Kaufmann (2003) do not categorize Austrian banks on the subject of size, liquidity 
and capitalization beforehand. They estimate the appropriate grouping of banks using individual 
bank balance sheet data covering the period from 1990:Q1 till 1998:Q4. Concerning the 
estimation technique, evidence is obtained within the Bayesian framework applying Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo simulation methods. As a result, banks are separated in three groups 
according to the groups’ average asset total. These groups then differ in reaction to monetary 
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policy measures. Banks with higher exposure to asymmetric information, such as the group of 
banks with the lowest average size, show the strongest lending response following a monetary 
policy action. Yet, as Frühwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann (2003) document, this support for the 
BLC is rendered weak since a very small percentage of banks form the smallest group. The vast 
majority of banks exhibit only minor lending reactions.           
 
Ashcraft (2006) conducts an empirical investigation and stresses the irrelevance of the BLC as a 
monetary transmission channel. Regarding the methodology, he retrieves annual and quarterly 
data from Call Reports for the period between 1976 and 1999. Ashcraft (2006) chooses ordinary 
least squares in a two-step approach, first testing responses of bank lending to monetary policy 
and second examining the link between monetary impulses, aggregated loans and real activity. 
He uses annual bank-level data to regress loan growth on insured deposits growth, lagged bank 
characteristics such as the ratio of securities to assets, a dummy variable for affiliation with a 
multibank holding company, the ratio of internal capital generation to assets, total assets etc., and 
the interaction of these characteristics with deposit growth. This regression indicates that the loan 
growth of banks affiliated with multibank holding companies responds less to deposit growth 
since affiliated banks have better access to alternative funds once the central bank shifts insured 
deposits. Affiliation reduces the financial constraints otherwise faced by banks. Ashcraft (2006) 
also regresses loan growth against lagged loan growth, a set of macro-variables such as the one 
year federal funds rate, aggregate nominal output growth and the consumer price index, a set of 
lagged bank characteristics and the interaction between the last two. The result is that monetary 
policy has little effect on affiliated bank lending. Therefore, his first key finding is – also 
observed by others in the past – that monetary policy is more effective the greater the share of 
liquidity-constrained banks within the banking system. Not only the size of the balance sheet, 
liquidity or capitalization buffer banks, but also affiliation shields loan portfolios from monetary 
policy impulses. In the second step, Ashcraft (2006) uses quarterly data and aggregates bank 
figures to the state level, treating the U.S. as a set of state economies. He regresses the state 
income growth on lagged output growth, lagged macro-variables, lagged bank characteristics and 
the interaction of the last two. The result is that output growth shows little variation in response 
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to policy when testing across different market share of constrained banks. This indicates the 
aforementioned irrelevance of the BLC for the real economy.  
 
So far, the reviewed studies (except Ashcraft 2006) only focus on the first link in the chain of 
monetary policy transmission and thus disregard the potential impact of the lending behaviour on 
spending as posed by the BLC. Again, empirical papers examine cross-sectional differences in 
the banking sector following monetary policy changes. Size, liquidity, capitalization and 
affiliation are included bank characteristics to proxy informational frictions and to dissolve the 
identification problem.  
 
Huang (2003) does not separate banks by these characteristics. The researcher follows existing 
approaches such as those used by Kashyap et al. (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, 1996), 
and focuses on possible asymmetries in the responses of bank customers, namely firms. The BLC 
stresses that some firms are bank-dependent. Thus, bank loans and other forms of debt such as 
bonds are not perfect substitutes. In case of restrictive monetary policy, banks shrink lending and 
firms which have limited access to the capital market reduce investment spending. Huang (2003) 
uses quarterly balance sheet data for a panel of U.K.-listed non-financial firms, which covers the 
period between 1975 and 1999, and finds evidence of the BLC in United Kingdom. For 
constrained firms, tight monetary policy reduces bank loans and decreases the bank-debt ratio. 
Restricted firms then experience lower debt volume while non-bank-dependent companies find 
alternative debt finance. This is what the BLC predicts. So, Huang (2003) tests the effect of 
monetary policy on the debt structure and separates firms according to their dependency on 
banks. The criterion which splits the sample in dependent and non-dependent companies is the 
average bank loan-total debt ratio across years. Bank-dependent firms used to be smaller than 
non-dependent enterprises. The (log of) London clearing bank base rate is chosen as the indicator 
for British monetary policy. Due to a lagged dependent variable, Huang (2003) applies the GMM 
estimator. Control variables used are logarithms of inventories as proxy for investment spending 
and a log of a firm’s debt-asset ratios. The latter variable aims at capturing amendments in firm’s 
finance pattern. In order to account for periods of relative restrictive stance of monetary policy or 
“tight money”, Huang (2003) includes a dummy variable and tests whether effects of monetary 
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policy vary across time or symmetrically affect the dependent variable. Furthermore, the 
researcher examines policy effects on the volume of bank loans and then on the volume of debt. 
Huang (2003) discovers that in the case of an increase in the interest rate, non-dependent 
companies raise bank borrowing. Controlling for a relative restrictive policy stance brings about a 
reduction in bank borrowing, but the magnitude is not as large as that of bank-dependent firms. 
These mostly small enterprises bear most of the reductions in the bank-debt ratio and the volume 
of bank loans. One explanation might be that bigger firms have a larger bargaining power so that 
banks shield the loan supply to these customers from changes in monetary policy. Finally, Huang 
(2003) tests the link between bank dependence and inventory investment. There is evidence that 
changes in policy might affect the investment demand of financially constrained firms (i.e., those 
with higher bank-debt ratios) more than investment spending of companies with easier access to 
alternative debt finance.  
 
An alternative way to test the BLC is to apply the method of VECM developed by Johansen 
(1988, 1995) and rests on VAR. Using this technique, a second strand of empirical investigations 
emerged in the past decade. The pivotal characteristic is that researchers again bring into play 
aggregated data in time series. Early contributions were made by De Bondt (1999) or by 
Hülsewig et al. (2001). The latter applied the method of VECM for Germany with aggregate bank 
loan data covering the period 1975:Q1 till 1998:Q4. Hülsewig et al. (2001) spotted three long-run 
co-integration vectors which are interpreted as loan supply and loan demand functions. The third 
equation displays the relationship between a bank’s volume of equity, real GDP and the inflation 
rate. The loan supply is approximated by equity and the spread between the loan rate and the 
short-term interest rate, which serves as proxy for the stance of monetary policy. The loan 
demand function is identified by real GDP and the loan rate. On the whole, the study is a good 
example for the existence of the identification problem. Hülsewig et al. (2001) conclude from 
their empirical results that monetary policy in Germany is operating through loan supply and loan 
demand simultaneously. But another interpretation is also plausible since they cannot single out 
changes in the loan supply which are not related to the loan demand. This shows the essential 
drawback of using aggregated data and why studies based on VAR mostly refer to the credit 
channel in their investigations and differentiate less between the BLC and the balance sheet 
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channel. The latter sub-channel stresses that central bank actions affect the creditworthiness of 
borrowers since the propagation of monetary impulses is transmitted via adjustments of a 
borrower’s net worth (liquid assets and marketable collaterals) and the external finance premium, 
as depicted by Bernanke et al. (1996). Restrictive monetary policy actions increase the bank loan 
rate in the BLC and the premium in the balance sheet channel. Hence, in both credit channel 
models contractionary central bank measures lead to an increase in financing costs and a decrease 
in loans and output. The question concerning the existence of the BLC remains open in this 
strand of empirical literature. Other recent studies such as Holtemöller (2003), Kakes and Sturm 
(2002), Hülsewig et al (2005) or Dedola and Lippi (2005) also apply the VAR or VECM, and 
these enquiries suffer from the same shortcomings of the applied method and retrieved data so the 
focus of this review remains on investigations using microeconomic data.    
III.4 Conclusion 
On theoretical grounds, Chapter II analyzes and concludes that the BLC does not exist as 
modeled by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). Up to now, empirical research has produced largely 
inconsistent results, e.g. Kashyap and Stein (1995), Hernando and Martinez-Pagés (2001) and de 
Bondt (1988). This is the more revealing as many of these investigations have deficiencies in 
controlling for other transmission channels that relate to relative prices (Cecchetti 1995, Oliner 
and Rudebusch 1996). That is, the vast majority of empirical research presented here fails to test 
the BLC in terms of an isolated monetary policy channel. 
 
The only investigation that succeeds to separate the BLC from other monetary transmission 
mechanisms is undertaken by Hernando and Martinez-Pagés (2001) for Spain. They are able to 
eliminate the effects stemming from relative prices such as interest rates and examine the impact 
of a reform-induced, exogenous restrictive shock to deposits on bank lending. Interestingly, their 
results do not corroborate the existence of the recently prominent channel. This is in line with the 
aforementioned theoretical critique expressing the view that monetary impulses are only 
transmitted via relative prices.  
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Rather, the researchers presented here mainly test for the extended interest rate channel that 
investigates the influence of the monetary policy on a special type of credit, bank loans. In this 
light some investigators find that some monetary policy affects bank lending and some not. 
Although the following aspects go beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth mentioning that 
one reason for this mixed picture could be the applied estimation method or the chosen dataset. 
Alternatively, other factors such as the different structure of the banking sector may play an 
important role in explaining why in some countries’ monetary impulses are more or less 
transmitted via bank loans (Ehrmann et al., 2001).   
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IV Puzzle with the Existence of the BLC – Evidence from a Cross-
Sectional and Panel Analysis 
IV.1  Introduction 
How does monetary policy affect the real economy? This age-old question still churns up 
economists since the debate has not come to a satisfying end. Scholars have identified several 
channels of monetary transmission. The BLC is one of them and it has found its place in standard 
economic textbooks. Yet, after almost two decades of empirical research its existence is still a 
puzzle. The seminal paper by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) models the BLC for the first time and 
hence paves the path for economists to test this monetary transmission mechanism. Therefore the 
BLC serves as the theoretical model for its current controversial empirical research – but it does 
not exist. This paper – as other investigations – does not find support for the existence of the 
BLC.   
 
In a nutshell, Bernanke and Blinder pose that the BLC stresses the importance of potential 
changes in the supply of loans as a result of monetary policy and a subsequent impact on 
aggregate demand for goods and services, in particular business and residential investments as 
well as consumer durables. That is, a tightening monetary policy such as an open market sale 
reduces nonbank deposits at depository institutions (“banks”) and bank reserves at the central 
bank. Therefore, banks have fewer funds available to supply loans and cut back lending. With 
borrowers depending on bank loans, investment spending is reduced.  
 
Chapter II provides theoretical reasons against the existence of the BLC. In particular, I show that 
the approach as presented by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) operates with lopsided loan demand, 
money demand and money supply functions. This invalidates the idea that potential changes in 
the supply of loans may affect aggregate demand for goods and services. A reduction of loans 
may restrict an individual investors, but the macroeconomic logic of the IS curve suggests that 
such a constraint is not binding.  
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Here, I focus on a contribution to the long body of empirical evidence and present empirical 
results that support the critique on the BLC by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) of the 
cross-section and panel data of more than 40 countries.  
  
I restrict myself to an investigation of cross-section data for two reasons. First, the cross-section 
approach enriches our understanding since prior tests with aggregated bank balance sheet 
variables (such as loans, deposits, etc.) only employ time series and panel data. The second 
argument in favor of my approach is that a cross-section of countries allows us to examine many 
economies around the world, both developed and developing. Studying the literature I found 
single and group country analyses but not an investigation with more than 40 countries included. 
Finally, cross-section data exhibit large differences between economies, suggesting that short-
term fluctuations are less relevant to the results. This focus on rather long-term differences 
enriches the current empirical research. 
 
Yet, the results obtained in the cross-section analysis could be blurred by unobserved long-
established firm financing patterns in many countries. This could also explain why, in some 
countries, bank loans are more accessible, and in some less available. In order to sort out this 
potential downside of the cross-section analysis I conducted a panel data investigation. With 
fixed effects regression I eliminated the aforementioned possible effect of omitted variables 
which differ across countries but are constant over time. 
IV.2  A Brief Review of the Debate on the Bank Lending Channel 
Before the empirical approach is explained it appears fruitful to reproduce its theoretical 
background. Here I only briefly summarize how Chapter II answers the following question: loans 
are special due to asymmetrical information, but does standard central bank policy have a direct 
quantitative impact beyond amendments of relative prices?  
The answer is no. The BLC dismisses the logic of the IS curve by claiming that loans constrain 
investments and thus affect the real economy. While this argument appears convincing for an 
individual investor, the macroeconomic logic of the IS curve suggests that such a constraint is not 
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binding. Moreover, the conclusion of a more effective central bank, as presented by Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988), is essentially based on the CC curve, the constructed substitute for the IS 
curve. I posit that the construction of the CC curve obfuscates more than it reveals. Furthermore, 
the IS curve in its conventional logic represents the goods market’s reaction to overall finance 
conditions as determined by the money market. These conditions embrace interest rates for bonds 
and loans. I show that a plausible inclusion of the loan rate in the functions of money demand and 
supply and not only in the functions of the loan market (as modelled by Bernanke and Blinder) 
brings about the textbook IS/LM results. To differentiate between forms of credit enriches our 
understanding, but it does not seem possible that the inclusion of another credit market brings 
about an additional impact on the real economy since the bond interest rate in the IS/LM 
represents all credit interest rates and credit markets. The BLC is also based on a special form of 
the loan demand function. Once employing an alternative version, the impact of an open market 
sale on loans is ambiguous, in line with the work of Brunner and Meltzer in the late 1960s. 
Overall, quantities such as loans and money do not matter since they are by-products and only 
mirror the stance of monetary policy. Economic decisions such as investment and consumption 
are driven by relative prices. Even in the case of the liquidity trap, in which money and bonds are 
perfect substitutes and the interest rate channel is ineffective, the BLC does not provide stimulus 
for investment as proposed by proponents. The reason is that money and loans are also perfect 
substitutes in the liquidity trap. Nonbanks primarily demand loans to hold money and not to 
invest. Hence, contractionary monetary policy reduces loans and money demand, but not 
investment. A central bank is not able to stimulate the real economy by providing liquidity if 
banks ration loans to nonbanks due to opaque credit risks of potential debtors. If the economic 
activity picks up and the repayment ability of debtors improves, banks grant more loans, so that 
the causality only runs from income to credit and not the reverse. Quantities such as money and 
credit do not additionally affect aggregate demand.          
 
This question – whether a central bank can overcome bank credit rationing by inducing liquidity 
– is addressed in the empirical approach. A vital aspect of the investigation is the choice of the 
dependent variable: I operate with the availability of bank loans in 2006 across 125 countries. In 
line with economic theory, higher inflation brings about uncertainty and induces banks to ration 
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credit if they are reluctant or impeded to raise interest rates, for example due to fears of adverse 
selection and moral hazard. In the approach I use the dependent variable availability of loans 
(AoL) that covers the question, “How easy is it to obtain a bank loan in your country with only a 
good business plan and no collateral?“ Therefore, banks do not raise the loan rate to curtail credit, 
they ration. Other empirical investigations operate with loans as a dependent variable which 
brings about identification problems. Using aggregated loans (instead of the loan supply) forces 
researchers to develop more sophisticated estimation techniques in order to single out impulses 
that stem from the supply side and not from the demand on the loan market. In this light, my 
approach is more direct since I address the loan supply using information about the availability of 
bank loans.   
IV.3  Empirical Approach 
In order to get a good grasp on the empirical approach, let us refer to the Figure 4. It exemplifies 
the understanding of the ECB on how monetary policy works. Here, the transmission of monetary 
impulses via money and credit is essential.  
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Figure 4: How the ECB Illustrates the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism (Source: www.ecb.int14) 
 
One arrow moves from bank and market interest rates and hits supply and demand in goods and 
labor markets. This arrow represents the interest rate channel which describes how interest rates 
affect investments goods and consumer durables. Bank and market interest rates also influence 
money and credit. This is illustrated by another arrow that indicates interest rates affecting money 
and credit markets. At this point it becomes controversial. ECB draws a further arrow from 
money and credit to goods and labor markets, indicating the recently developed and propagated 
mechanism of the BLC. That is, a central bank has an additional impact on aggregate demand -
beyond the traditional interest rate channel- when it alters money and the loan supply. Yet, do 
money and credit have an isolated impact on aggregate demand?   
                                                 
14
  This figure is extracted from the following document: The Monetary Policy of the ECB (Second Edition, 
January 2004); Chart 3.1:“A stylised illustration of the transmission mechanism from interest rate to prices” 
 
Puzzle with the Existence of the BLC – Evidence from a Cross-Sectional and Panel Analysis 
 
 55 
The response is still no. Changes in money and credit are by-products of monetary policy and are 
not responsible for variations in aggregate demand. Rather, relative prices account for 
amendments of demand in the goods markets and are therefore vital for the transmission of 
monetary impulses. For instance, expansionary monetary policy reduces interest rates (money 
rises) and enhances investment and aggregate demand via decreasing cost-of-capital. Reduced 
interest rates also increase money demand (and money) that is not connected to the real economy. 
Money and aggregate demand correlate only coincidentally since money is a by-product. A 
similar argument holds for credit and invalidates the idea of the BLC. Increased money – as put 
forward by the BLC – enhances credit that affects investment. But this line of argument is based 
on underlying interest rates adjustments such as the loan rate. Once introducing relative prices, 
money and credit do not account for shifts in aggregate demand since the reduced loan rate 
makes investments more attractive. 
 
Based on the intuition obtained from this figure, I designed the empirical approach. I focused on 
the interaction between a central bank and bank lending to work out driving forces of the 
availability of loans. Proponents of the BLC state monetary policy and changes in money have a 
direct impact on loans. Credit in turn affects aggregate demand, but I disregard this aspect. I show 
that money as the only independent variable is significant in explaining the availability of loans. 
Once I control for income and inflation, the inclusion of interest rates causes money to become 
insignificant and a by-product. Only interest rates and not quantities such as money account for 
adjustments of loans. This result is in line with the aforementioned irrelevance of quantities for 
the transmission mechanism of monetary impulses. In sum, I do not find evidence for the 
quantitative relevance of the BLC.   
IV.4  Methodology of the Cross-Section Analysis 
I retrieved the data from three sources: World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
2006/2007, International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics and World Bank’s 
World Development Indicator. The first source collected data during 2006-2007. The latter two 
sources provide data for 1985 – 2005. Since I opt for a cross-section method, I choose a long time 
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period to obtain a solid mean of the sample for each country and each variable. For example, the 
World Economic Forum surveyed 8,000 business professionals from 125 countries in 2006. 
Other sources mostly provide data for 60 – 120 countries. Consequently, the number of countries 
and their composition vary with every variable. Since I apply the method of cross-section that 
contains a wide range of developed and developing countries around the world, the number of 
observations suffice to grant a solid and reliable analysis.  
   
Using the arithmetic mean to determine average interest rates appears inadequate due to periods 
of hyperinflation which would then enter excessively. Therefore, I use the geometric mean 
reflecting the average interest rates appropriately. In general, this investigation focuses on growth 
rates so that the arithmetic mean is the only valid option in the case of GDP per capita.  
 
As is the case in several cross-country analyses, the problem of heteroskedastic error terms comes 
up. Thus, the regressions I perform in this paper are White-heteroskedasticity corrected. 
Otherwise, the basic assumption of an error term with a constant variance can be rejected.15   
 
This investigation looks into a cross-section of transition and industrialized economies and 
developing countries. This implies that variables such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) vary 
across economies significantly. The histogram of the average inflation rates in Figure 5 shows 
that they are not normally distributed.16. The assumption of a normal-distribution can easily be 
rejected on the bases of the Jarque-Bera statistic.17 If the value of the Jarque-Bera statistic is 
                                                 
15
  The fact that variables vary across countries leads to the decision to control for the heteroskedatsic error 
term in the regression. This correction is necessary since the dependent variable AoL follows a different, normal 
distribution. A heteroskedastic error term produces the problem that the estimators obtained from the OLS regression 
method are not efficient. An unbiased estimator is efficient if it has a smaller variance than the other possible 
unbiased estimators. In econometric models with heteroskedastic error terms, the regression line obtained from the 
OLS systematically overstates observations with higher error variances, since the sum of the squared residuals of 
high variance error terms is likely to be higher and affect the OLS regression more than observations with a lower 
error variance. The variances of the estimated parameters are not the lowest possible variance and the regression line 
obtained “favours” the information from the high variance error term group. Therefore, statistical tests such as the t-
statistic or the construction of confidence intervals are not reliable. As a result, the White-correction for 
heteroskedasticity is necessary. 
16
   Other included variables are similarly distributed. 
17
  The Jarque-Bera-statistic combines skewness and kurtotis. In the case of symmetric or approximately 
symmetric distribution the skewness statistic is zero or at least close to it. The kurtosis measures the thickness of the 
tails. If a variable’s distribution has rather thick tails it means that it is very common to have large deviations of this 
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larger than 5.99 the null assumption of normality of the residuals has to be rejected at the 5 
percent level.  
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Figure 5: CPI and log (CPI) 
 
Concerning the functional form, I analyze the distribution of variables and plot histograms. 
Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate the distribution of two variables, AoL and CPI. AoL is 
approximately normally distributed and an exception in the set of variables. Unsurprisingly, the 
rest of variables are unevenly distributed. To depict this, I present the histogram of CPI in Figure 
5.  
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Figure 6: AoL 
                                                                                                                                                              
variable from its mean. One generally accepts a distribution to have thin enough tails if the kurtosis statistic is close 
to the value of three.  
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Using the logarithm of CPI, the distribution of average inflation rates becomes approximately 
normally distributed. Descriptive statistics and in particular, the Jarque-Bera indicator, support 
the conclusion from the graphical illustration. Skewed distribution of other variables can also be 
transformed into a nearly normal distribution by computing the logarithm. This is the first hint at 
the functional form of the OLS.    
 
I also run regressions with the non-logarithmic forms, but non-logarithmic interest rates such as 
money market rates or risk premium on lending show a highly uneven distribution with some 
countries being outliers. The assumption of linearity could be rejected for the regressions. Only 
M2 per GDP is a variable that could also be included in the non-logarithmic form without 
amending the results obtained in presented regressions.   
 
Figure 7 contains further hints at applying the logarithm. It shows that a logarithmic approach 
improves the correlation between CPI and AoL since the correlation coefficient drops from -0.26 
to -0.46. The use of logarithmic average inflation rates ensures a better interpretation of the link 
between the average inflation rate and availability of bank loans, where higher numbers display 
easier access. The scatter plots hint at a possible negative impact. Higher income per capita and 
systematically lower inflation might ease the access to loans. Again, the logarithm was used to 
obtain a better comparison between sets of variables. This result also holds for plots of other 
variables and AoL, given the logarithmic approach (Appendix).18   
 
                                                 
18
  Only M2 per GDP deviates from this result since the transformation does not amend the variable materially. 
Therefore, the correlation coefficient remains nearly unchanged. 
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Figure 7: CPI and log (CPI) vs. AoL 
 
As the last test of the functional form, I ran the White-heteroskedasticity test proving that the 
assumption of homoskedasticity cannot be rejected. The functional form is also confirmed by the 
results of the test. Based on the F-test approach, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is 
rejected. That is, fitted squared residuals are not systematically related to any known explanatory 
variables relevant to the model.  
IV.5  Empirical Evidence of the Cross-Section Analysis 
The results of the first set of regressions are presented in Table 5. The availability of bank loans 
(AoL) in 2006 is the dependent variable in the first set. Recall the intuition from Figure 4: the 
proponents of the BLC focus on the loan supply and claim that monetary policy directly affects 
bank lending, here represented by the availability of loans. Independent variables are explanatory 
variables in the logarithmic form that shed light on how and to what extent exogenous variables 
explain the dependent variable AoL. As shown in Figure 4, apparently money also explains bank 
lending.  
 
Regressing AoL on M2 per GDP brings about the expected results as shown in Table 5, 
Regression 1. M2 per GDP displays the contribution of money and quasi-money to the 
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availability of bank loans and thus, it is significant with the t-statistic of 3.34. The first regression 
supports this insight obtained in the cross-section of 107 countries. An increase of money by 10 
percent boosts the availability of loans by 0.56 on the scale from 1 to 7.  
 
In order to run regressions in line with economic theory, I control for money: Nonbanks may 
either obtain loans from banks or via open market operations from the central bank. The volume 
of these open market operations between the central bank and nonbanks is well depicted by the 
central bank reserves. Thus, in Regression 2, I control also for this balance sheet item by 
retrieving international reserves from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and subtracting 
them from money. Then, the perceived availability of loans only refers to bank loans. By 
comparing results of the first and the second regressions, it becomes clear that the inclusion of 
international reserves is empirically immaterial for my investigation. Hence, I run further 
regressions merely with money, M2 per GDP and controlled for this aspect in Regression 8. 
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Dependent Variable: Availability of Loans in 200619 
Independent 
Variable 
1st LS 2nd LS 3rd LS 4th LS 5th LS 6th LS 7th LS 8th LS 9th LS 
Constant 
1.34 
(2.27) 
1.79 
(5.63) 
-0.81 
(-2.78) 
-0.89 
(-3.14) 
-0.55 
(-1.45) 
0.44 
(0.56) 
0.71 
(0.97) 
1.61 
(1.36) 
-0.70† 
(-1.02) 
M2 per GDP20, 
(log.) 
0.56 
(3.34) 
0.45 
(4.85) 
0.26 
(4.83) 
0.24 
(4.91) 
0.23 
(4.02) 
0.28 
(1.25) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.08 
(-0.31) 
0.42 
(1.85) 
GDP per 
Capita21, (log.) 
  
0.43 
(8.93) 
0.44 
(9.73) 
0.42 
(8.85) 
0.36 
(3.69) 
0.40 
(4.86) 
0.42 
(4.56) 
0.37 
(3.79) 
Consumer Price 
Index22, (log.)     
-0.11 
(-1.96) 
0.09 
(0.80) 
-0.07 
(-0.72) 
0.10 
(0.83) 
-0.15 
(-1.62) 
Money Market 
Rates23, (log.)   
 
 
  
-0.45 
(-2.60)  
-0.60 
(-3.01)  
Risk Premium on 
Lending24, (log.)       
-0.27 
(-2.44)   
Observations 107 94 106 105 95 55 40 52 55 
R2 0.26 0.20 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.74 0.59 0.59 
Jarque-Bera 4.63 4.36 16.20 0.39 0.72 0.35 0.42 0.12 0.05 
Table 5: Ordinary Least Square 
(NOTES: All t-statistics (in parenthesis) are White-corrected to adjust 
for heteroskedasticity.  
 International reserves are subtracted from money;   
† Sample of countries restricted to those from Regression 6) 
                                                 
19
  In the World Economic Forum´s Global Competitiveness Report 2006/2007, business professionals in 125 
countries answer the following question: „How easy is it to obtain a bank loan in your country with only a good 
business plan and no collateral? (1=impossible, 7=easy)“ 
20
 The source for this variable is World Bank: Money and quasi money (M2) as percentage of GDP (code 
FM.LBL.MQMY.GD.ZS) in order to display the proportion of money to produced goods and services.     
21
  See World Bank´s address www.wdi.org for the exact definition of the variable: “GDP per capita based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar 
has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
Data are in constant 2000 international dollars.“ The specific code of the variable is NY.GDP.PCAP.KD. 
22
  The source of the variable is the IFS: For our purposes of computing an average inflation rate for each 
country with approximately similar length of the period as basis, it suffices that the variable only takes into account 
figures from 1996 till 2005. The code differs across countries. 
23
  The source of the variable is the IFS: Money market rate´ codes vary from country to country for very short-
term interest rates due to differing institutional designs of money markets. 
24
  See www.wdi.org for the precise definition of FR.INR.RISK: “The Risk Premium on Lending is the interest 
rate charged by banks on loans to prime private sector customers minus the "risk free" Treasury bill interest rate at 
which short-term government securities are issued or traded in the market.”  
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In the third regression I include the explanatory variable GDP per capita. Theory expects banks to 
provide more credit in case of a higher level of the banking sector and financial markets. This 
aspect is proxied by the logarithmic form of GDP per capita. More developed financial systems 
channels mean more efficiency to those with most the productive projects. According to Mishkin 
(1992: 115), asymmetric information and problems of adverse selection and moral hazard hamper 
the channelling of financial means. Thus, the lower asymmetric information is, the more 
developed the financial system. If problems of adverse selection and moral hazard become 
reduced, the risk premium reflecting the imperfections in the financial system decreases and 
banks are induced to provide more loans. The impact of GDP per capita on the availability of 
bank loans is significant with a t-statistic of 8.93. Increasing the GDP per capita by 10 percent 
extends the availability of bank loans by 0.43. Including GDP per capita, the impact of M2 per 
GDP on AoL abates but retains its level of significance. The Jarque-Bera statistic indicates that 
the third regression exceeds the threshold of 5.99. Indonesia mainly accounts for the uneven 
distribution of residuals because it performs extraordinary with respect to availability of loans. 
With 5.4, it is the fourth best country out of 125. While the level of bank lending is comparable to 
developed countries, the rest of the variables on the right-hand-side relate more to the level of 
developing variables.25 Indonesia might have gained momentum with respect to easier access to 
bank loans in 2006, but other less biased variables are average, representing Indonesia as a 
developing country. Dropping Indonesia as outlier, the Jarque-Bera indicator improves 
significantly and displays 0.39, as shown by the fourth regression. The number of observed 
countries is 105. The variables and R2 do not change significantly with respect to the third 
regression.  
 
In the fifth regression the average inflation rate, CPI, is included. By granting loans, banks take 
inflation rates into account and credit price with respect to the expected level of future inflation 
rates. Again, higher inflation brings about uncertainty and it induces banks to ration credit if they 
are reluctant to or impeded from raising interest rates. The inclusion of CPI is aimed at covering 
this aspect of banking. An alternative and equally valid argument is to incorporate 
                                                 
25
  For instance, Norway also achieves 5.4 in AoL. Indonesia (Norway) performs as follows: log(M2 per GDP): 
3.66 (3.99), log(GDP per capita): 6.47 (10.42), log(Consumer Price Index): 2.65 (0.75) and log(Money market rates): 
2.68 (1.66).  
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macroeconomic variables GDP and CPI, which are assumed exogenous, to control for effects 
stemming from the loan demand. CPI is significant at the 10 percent level. Adding CPI to 
existing variables slightly mitigates the impact of the M2 per GDP and GDP per capita on AoL. 
Increasing the average inflation rate by 10 percent, e.g., from 5 percent to 5.5 percent annual 
inflation, reduces the availability of bank loans by 0.11. The number of countries drops to 95 
because data is not available for some countries. R2 and Jarque-Bera show a satisfying level of 
0.63 and 0.72, respectively.  
 
One further explanatory variable for the provision of bank loans is the level of interest rates. 
Money market rates and the risk premium on bank lending are proxies for the level of interest 
rates and are included in the sixth, seventh and eighth regressions. Their impact on the 
availability of loans is significant and negative. A higher level of average money market rates 
could be the result of contractionary monetary policy. As consequence, banks reduce credit. 
Likewise, rising risk premiums on lending hints at higher level of uncertainty with respect to 
economic activity, which also reduces the level of loans supplied. CPI also proxies the 
uncertainty and hence falls to insignificance in the last three regressions once interest rates are 
considered. In the seventh regression, CPI becomes negative.  
 
Yet, the most important result of this table is the following: once the level of interest rates and the 
risk premium is included M2 per GDP falls to insignificance (Regressions 6-8). That is, money 
does not explain bank lending if one takes interest rates into account. I do not find support for a 
direct transmission channel running from the quantity of money to the perceived availability of 
loans. Rather, results support my view that monetary impulses are transmitted via relative prices 
such as interest rates. Changes in money are only a by-product of monetary policy, for instance. 
This by-product does not affect the level of loans. On the contrary, interest rates influence the 
availability of loans via the argument of capital-of-costs for investment and durable consumer 
goods. This empirical evidence finds no support for the prediction of the BLC that there is an 
additional channel of monetary transmission mechanism. This additional channel should operate 
even if the interest rate channel is effective and makes monetary policy more potent in 
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influencing the real economy. In the sixth, seventh and eighth regressions the number of 
observations plummets to 55, 40 and 52, respectively. The sample of countries is reduced because 
including more independent variables makes the mismatch problem of data availability more 
acute. However, it remains at a level that is still adequate to avoid invalidating the result of the 
regressions, as shown by following regressions. The fit of the model is satisfying, demonstrating 
the level of 0.62 in the sixth, 0.74 in the seventh and 0.59 in the eighth regression. The Jarque-
Bera statistic points out the normality of residual distribution at the level of 0.35 in the sixth, 0.42 
in the seventh and 0.12 in the eighth regression.            
 
In the regression I check whether the declining sample affects presented results. By rewriting the 
variable “constant” as the ratio of money market rates to itself, the sample is reduced to 55 
observations. The ninth regression exhibits the same result as in Regression 5, showing that 
money apparently explains bank lending, although some explanatory power disappears. However, 
money still displays weak significance so one can conclude from this test that the declining 
country sample plays a limited role in explaining the independent variable. Analyzing Regression 
6 again, money becomes insignificant and this check indicates that its insignificance results from 
the inclusion of interest rates and risk premiums, not from changes in the sample. 
IV.6  Panel Data Analysis 
The cross-section analysis and its results might suffer from omitted variables that could influence 
the availability of bank loans and interfere with the explanatory power of the independent 
variables. One may think of potential factors such as the tendency of some economies to tap a 
firm’s internal funds or capital markets as a source of financial means instead of bank loans. In 
many countries this propensity might be manifested by the established institutional design of the 
financial system. These could be reasons why bank loans in some countries are more accessible 
and less available in some. 
 
In order to fortify the results obtained in the cross-section analysis I conduct a panel data 
investigation. This is possible because the dependent variable, availability of loans, is collected 
not only for 2006 but also for the second point in time, 2002. Therefore I am enabled to analyze 
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changes in the dependent variable over time. With fixed effects regression I use the main tool for 
analysis of panel data. In doing so, I eliminate the potential effect of unobserved variables which 
differ across countries but are constant over time.   
 
Panel data analysis could suffer from two possible shortcomings: omitted variables vary both 
across countries and over time, and the unavailability of panel data. The former drawback does 
not apply to my case because it seems plausible to assume that a firm’s financing patterns depend 
on the manifested structure of the financial system which is different in every country. If the 
structure changes no erratic large-scale shifts are expected. This assumption especially holds for 
the period of time given by the limited availability of the data on the accessibility of loans (2002 
and 2006). In order to generate a balanced panel I adjust the independent variables. For each of 
the two data set entries, 2002 and 2006, I calculate an arithmetic mean of independent variables 
for three previous years. Again, in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
2002 and 2006, business professionals answer the question of how easy it is to obtain a bank 
loan. In doing so, I assume respondents would take into consideration the evolution of 
influencing variables over short time period of approximately three years. I repeat this step for 
2006 with the only exception that the particular years 2003 – 2005 (instead of 2004 – 2006) are 
included. Otherwise, the panel was not balanced.                        
 
The functional form of regressions remains as applied in the cross-section analysis: logarithm of 
independent variables. Figure 8 contains further hints at applying the logarithm because it shows 
that a logarithmic approach improves the correlation between M2 per GDP and AoL. The 
correlation coefficient rises from 0.36 to 0.44 and hence, the use of logarithm ensures a better 
interpretation of the link between money and the availability of bank loans. The scatter plots hint 
at a possible positive impact. Higher ratios of M2 to GDP might be linked to easier access to 
loans. As in the cross-section analysis, I use the logarithm to obtain a better comparison between 
sets of variables. This effect is also generated for plots of other independent variables and AoL 
and can be found in the appendix.  
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Figure 8: M2 per GDP and log (M2 per GDP) vs. AoL 
 
Table 6 depicts the results from applying the panel ordinary least square. As in the cross-section 
analysis Indonesia is dropped as outlier. The number of countries included is 54 and every 
country enters with two observations per point in time.  
 
The approach corresponds to the procedure in the cross-section analysis and the results are 
presented here. In the first two regressions one can observe that money, again, is significant in 
explaining the availability of bank loans, although money displays only weak significance once I 
control for GDP per capita in the second regression. It appears that GDP per capita sufficiently 
controls for loan demand effects because the inclusion of inflation brings about insignificant 
results. Hence, the exclusion of inflation is immaterial to the core approach.     
 
The key moment occurs when I introduce money market rates in the third regression because 
money loses its explanatory power and turns insignificant while money market rates (and GDP 
per capita) remain the influencing variable. This result also holds if I alter the functional form and 
run regressions without the logarithm of independent variables. As result, this alteration does not 
provide support for the hypothesis of the BLC to stand for an additional monetary transmission 
channel, as depicted by regressions four to six.      
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Dependent Variable: Availability of Loans in 2002 and 200626 
Independent 
Variable 
1st LS 2nd LS 3rd LS 4th LS 5th LS 6th LS 
Constant 
1.10 
(1.11) 
-1.47** 
(-2.24) 
0.52 
(0.68) 
2.97** 
(10.71) 
2.55** 
(9.90) 
2.91** 
(11.36) 
M2 per GDP 
0.61** 
(2.46)# 
0.33* 
(1.59)# 
0.003 
(0.04)# 
0.009** 
(2.05) 
0.007* 
(1.81) 
0.005 
(1.33) 
GDP per 
Capita 
 
0.47** 
(8.03)# 
0.44** 
(8.89)# 
 
5.63E-05** 
(8.60) 
5.43E-05** 
(9.39) 
Money Market 
Rates 
  
-0.47** 
(-5.53)# 
  
-0.03** 
(-3.47) 
Total Panel 
Observations 
108 108 108 108 108 108 
R2 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.76 0.82 0.84 
Jarque-Bera 0.07 3.08 2.91 0.32 1.64 0.35 
Table 6: Panel Ordinary Least Square (Fixed Effects) 
(NOTES: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; 
# Variable in log) 
IV.7  Conclusion 
In my cross-section and panel data analysis, I deviate from the mainstream twofold: the sample of 
developing and developed countries and the availability of loans as a dependent variable. With 
these choices I expand the scope of the investigation on the BLC and I bypass the identification 
problem arising in most of other empirical approaches because the mainstream analyzes the 
response of aggregated bank loans to monetary policy changes. Moreover, I directly test weather 
monetary policy can overcome banks` credit rationing by injecting liquidity.  
My results do not corroborate a direct transmission channel, running from the quantity of money 
to the perceived availability of loans. Rather, results back up the view that monetary impulses are 
transmitted via relative prices such as interest rates and asset prices. 
                                                 
26
  In the World Economic Forum´s Global Competitiveness Reports 2002/2003 and 2006/2007 business 
professionals in 80 and 125, respectively, countries answer the following question: „How easy is it to obtain bank 
loan in your country with only a good business plan and no collateral? (1=impossible, 7=easy)“ 
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Figure 9: Scatter Plots of Variables in the Cross-Section Analysis 
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Panel Analysis 
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Figure 10: Scatter Plots of Variables in the Panel Data Analysis 
 
 
 
References 
 
 71 
References   
Akerlof, G.A., 1970. “Market for ‘lemons’: qualitative uncertainty and the market 
mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, pp. 488-500 
 
Altunbas, Y., Fazylov, O. and Molyneux, P., 2002. “Evidence on the bank lending channel in 
Europe”, Journal of Banking and Finance 26, pp. 2093-2110 
 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S., 1991. “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations”, Review of Economic Studies 
58, pp. 277-297 
 
Ashcraft, A.B., 2006. “New Evidence on Lending Channel”, Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 751-775  
 
Bajec, L. and Lambsdorff, J. Graf, 2006. “There Is No Bank Lending Channel!”, Passau 
Economic Discussion Papers, University of Passau, No. V-46-06  
 
Barran, F., Coudert, V. and Mojon, B., 1996. “The Transmission of Monetary Policy in 
European Countries”, CEPII, Document de travail no 1996 – 03 February 
 
Bernanke, B.S., 2008. “Ben S Bernanke: The economic outlook”, downloaded on 11 March 
2008 from the following internet site: http://www.bis.orgreviewr080118a.pdf 
 
Bernanke, B.S. and Blinder, A.S., 1988. ”Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 435-439 
 
Bernanke, B.S. and Blinder, A.S., 1992. ”The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of 
Monetary Transmission”, American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 901-921 
 
Bernanke, B.S. and Gertler, M., 1995. “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of 
Monetary Policy Transmission”, Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 
27-48 
References 
 72 
Bernanke, B.S., Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, S., 1996. “The financial accelerator and the flight to 
quality”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 1-15 
 
Bernanke, B.S. and Mihov, I., 1998. “Measuring Monetary Policy”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 113, No. 3, pp. 869-902 
 
Bichsel, R. and Perrez, J., 2005. “In Quest of the Bank Lending Channel: Evidence for 
Switzerland Using Individual Bank Data“, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für 
Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, Vol. 141, No. 2, pp. 165-190 
 
Bindseil, U., 2004. “Monetary Policy Implemenation“, Oxford University Press 
 
Bondt, G.J. de, 1998. “Credit channels in Europe: bank level panel analyses”, De 
Nederlandsche Bank, Research Memorandum WO&E no. 543/9813  
 
Bondt, G.J. de, 1999. “Credit channels in Europe: cross-country investigation”, De 
Nederlandsche Bank, Research Memorandum WO&E no. 569/9902  
 
Brainard, W., 1964. “Financial intermediaries in a theory of monetary control”, Yale 
Economic Essays, Vol. 4, pp. 443-484' 
 
Brainard, W. and Tobin, J., 1963. “Financial intermediaries and the effectiveness of monetary 
controls”, American Economic Review”, Vol. 533, pp. 383-400 
 
Brissimis, S.N., Kamberoglou, N.C. and Simmigiannis, G.T., 2001. “Is there a bank lending 
channel of monetary policy in Greece? Evidence from bank level data”, European 
Central Bank, Working Paper No. 104, December 
 
Brunner, K., 1974. „Zwei alternative Theorien des Geldangebotsprozesses: Geldmarkt- versus 
Kreditmarkttheorie”, in: Geldtheorie, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, pp. 114-148 
 
Brunner, K. and Meltzer, A.H., 1966. “A Credit Market Theory of the Money Supply and an 
Explanation of two Puzzles in U.S. Monetary Policy”, in: Studi in onore di Marco 
Fanno, pp. 151-176 
 
References 
 
 73 
Brunner, K. and Meltzer, A.H., 1968. “Liquidity Traps for Money, Bank Credit, and Interest 
Rates”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 1-37 
 
Brunner, K. and Meltzer, A.H. 1972. “Money, debt, and economic activity”, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 80, pp. 951-977' 
 
Cecchetti, S.G., 1995. “Distinguishing Theories of Monetary Transmission Mechanism”, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 83-97 
 
Dedola, L. and Lippi, F., 2005. “The monetary transmission mechanism: Evidence from the 
industries of five OECD countries”, European Economic Review 49, pp. 1543-1569 
 
Diamond, D.W., 1984. “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”, Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 51, July, pp. 393-414 
 
Ehrmann, M., Gambacorta, L, Martinez-Pagés, J., Silvestre, P. and Worms, A., 2001. 
“Financial Systems and the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the Euro 
Area”, European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 105, December  
 
European Central Bank, 2004. “The Monetary Policy of the ECB”, downloaded on 20 
September 20th 2007 from the following internet site: 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/monetarypolicy2004en.pdf 
 
Farinha, L. and Marques, C.R., 2001. “The bank lending channel of monetary policy: 
Identification and Estimation using Portuguese micro bank data”, European Central 
Bank, Working Paper No. 102, December 
 
Favero, C.A., Giavazzi, F. and Flabbi, L., 1999. “The transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy in Europe: Evidence from banks’ balance sheets”, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 7231 
 
Freixas, X. and Rochet, J.-C., 1997. “Microeconomics of Banking”, MIT Press 
 
References 
 74 
Frühwirth-Schnatter, S. and Kaufmann, S., 2003. “Investigating asymmetries in the bank 
lending channel – An analysis using Austrian banks’ balance sheet data”, 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Working Paper No. 85 
 
Gambacorta, L., 2001. “Bank-specific characteristics and monetary policy transmission: The 
case of Italy”, European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 103, December 
 
Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, S., 1993. “The Role of Credit Market Imperfections in the Monetary 
Transmission Mechanism: Arguments and Evidence”, Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 43-64 
 
Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, S., 1994. “Monetary Policy, Business Cycles and the Behavior of 
Small Manufacturing Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 2, pp. 
309-340 
 
Gertler, M. and Hubbard, R.G., 1988. “Financial Factors in Business Fluctuations”, in: 
Financial Market Volatility, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp. 33-78 
 
Gurley, J.G. and Shaw, E.S., 1955. “Financial aspects of economic development”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 45, pp. 515-538 
 
Gurley, J. G, and Shaw, E.S., 1960, “Money in a theory of finance”, The Brookings 
Institution 
 
Haan, L. de, 2003. “Microdata evidence on the bank lending channel in Netherlands”, De 
Economist, Vol. 151, No. 3 
 
Hernando, I. and Martinez-Pagés, J., 2001. “Is there a bank lending channel of monetary 
policy in Spain?”, European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 99, December 
 
Hicks, J.R., 1937. “Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’, a suggested interpretation”, Econometrica, 
Vol. 5, pp. 147-159 
 
References 
 
 75 
Holtemöller, O. 2003. “Further VAR Evidence for the Effectiveness of a Credit Channel in 
Germany”, Applied Economics Quarterly 49, pp. 359-381 
  
Huang, Z., 2003. “Evidence of the bank lending channel in the UK”, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 27, pp. 491-510 
 
Hubbard, R.G., 1995. “Is there a ‘Credit Channel’ for Monetary Policy“, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis Review, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 63-77 
 
Hubbard, R.G., 1998. “Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment” Journal of Economic 
Literature, American Economic Association, Vol. 36, No. 1, March, pp. 193-225  
 
Hülsewig, O., Mayer, E. and Wollmershäuser, T., 2005. “Bank loan supply and monetary 
policy transmission in Germany: An assessment based on matching impulse 
responses”, CESifo, Working Paper No. 1380 
 
Hülsewig, O., Winker, P. and Worms, A., 2001. “Bank Lending in the Transmission of 
Monetary Policy: A VECM Analysis for Germany”, Working Paper 08, School of 
Business Administration, International University in Germany, Bruchsal 
 
Johansen, S., 1988. “Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors”, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, Vol. 12. pp. 231-254 
Johansen, S., 1995. “Likelihood-Based Interference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive 
Models”, Oxford University Press 
 
Kakes, J. and Sturm, J.-E., 2002. “Monetary policy and bank lending: Evidence from German 
banking groups”, Journal of Banking and Finance 26, pp. 2077-2092 
 
Kashyap, A.K., Lamont, O.A. and Stein, J.C., 1994. “Credit Conditions and the Cyclical 
Behavior of Inventories”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 2, pp. 565-
593 
 
References 
 76 
Kashyap, A.K. and Stein, J.C., 1993. “Monetary Policy and Bank Lending”, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 4317 
 
Kashyap, A.K. and Stein, J.C., 1995. “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Bank Balance 
Sheets”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 42, pp. 151-195 
 
Kashyap, A.K. and Stein, J.C., 2000. “What Do a Million Observations Say About the 
Transmission of Monetary Policy”, American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 3, pp. 
407-428 
 
Kashyap, A.K., Stein, J.C. and Wilcox, D.W., 1993. “Monetary Policy and Credit Conditions: 
Evidence from the Composition of External Finance”, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 83, No. 1, pp. 78-98 
 
Kaufmann, S., 2001. “Asymmetries in bank behaviour. Austria during the 1990s”, European 
Central Bank, Working Paper No. 97, December 
 
Kishan, R.P. and Opiela, T.P., 2000. “Bank Size, Bank Capital, and the Bank Lending 
Channel”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 121-141 
 
Kuttner, K. N. and Mosser, P.C., 2002. “The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Some 
Answers and Further Questions”, Federal Reserve Bank New York, Economic Policy 
Review, May, pp. 15-26 
Loupias, C., Savignac, F. and Sevestre, P., 2001. “Monetary policy and bank lending in 
France: Are there asymmetries?”, European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 101, 
December 
 
Macleod, H.D., 1855. “The Theory and Practice of Banking; With the Elementary Principles 
of Currency; Credit; and Exchanges”, Volume I, Longman, Brown, Green and 
Longmans 
 
Mishkin, F.S., 1992. “Anatomy of Financial Crisis”, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 
2, No. 2, pp. 115-130 
 
References 
 
 77 
Mishkin, F.S., 1995. “Symposium on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 3-10 
 
Mishkin, F.S., 2006. “The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets”, seventh 
edition, Pearson Addison Wesley 
 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M.H., 1958. “The cost of capital, corporation finance and the 
theory of investment”, American Economic Review, Vol. 48, pp. 261-297  
 
Oliner, S.D. and Rudebusch, G.D., 1996. “Monetary Policy and Credit Conditions: Evidence 
from the Composition of External Finance: Comment”, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 300-309 
 
Patinkin, D., 1965. “Money, Interest, and Prices”, second edition, Harper & Row 
 
Peek, J. and Rosengren, E.S., 1995. “Bank lending and the transmission of monetary policy”, 
in: Is Bank Lending Important for the Transmission of Monetary Policy?, Peek and 
Rosengren (eds), Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 39, June, 
47-68 
 
Stöß, E., 1996. “Enterprises’ Financing Structure and their Response to Monetary Policy 
Stimuli – An Analysis based on the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Corporate Balance Sheet 
Statistics”, Discussion paper 9, Deutsche Bundesbank 
Thornton, H., 1802. “An Enquiry into Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great 
Britain”, Hatchard 
 
Tobin, J., 1969. “A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory”, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, Vol. 1, pp. 15-29 
 
Topi, J. and Vilmunen, J., 2001. “Transmission of monetary shocks in Finland: Evidence from 
bank level data on loans”, European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 100, December 
 
References 
 78 
Tsatsaronis, C., 1995. “Is there a Credit Channel in the Transmission of Monetary Policy. 
Evidence from Four Countries”, in: Financial Structure and the Monetary 
Transmission Mechanism, Bank for International Settlements, Vol. 394, pp. 154-187 
 
Wicksell, K., 1898. “Geldzins und Güterpreise. Eine Studie über die den Tauschwert des 
Geldes bestimmenden Ursachen”, Gustav Fischer 
 
Westerlund, J., 2003. “A Panel Data Test of the Bank Lending Channel in Sweden”, 
downloaded on 20 September 2007 from the following internet site: 
http://www.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/Papers/WP03_16.pdf 
 
Worms, A., 2001. “The reaction of bank lending to monetary policy measures in Germany”, 
European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 96, December  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
